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Introduction 
 
 
Uncanny, yet familiar  
 
We are all familiar with images of robots, cyborgs, replicants, clones, and chimeras as well as 
superhumanly intelligent, vast computer networks. Science fiction literature and movies are richly 
populated by such figures and creatures. Ever since Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein the creation of such 
fictional figures has always served the purpose of questioning some aspects of our interpersonal 
lives, our attitudes, values and aspirations or most fundamentally, the human condition itself and the 
paths we may be taking. Most science fiction testifies to a thoroughly naturalized understanding of 
the world where scientific progress has enabled the almost unbounded manipulation of biological 
processes, the mechanization of intelligence and the seamless integration of the organic with the 
synthetic, an exchange between the biological and digital worlds. On the other hand, science fiction 
also probes the limits of this naturalization and a common theme is precisely the demonstration of 
some residual, yet essential element of humanness that resists technologization.  
This thesis is to a great extent about a contemporary intellectual movement called 
transhumanism that holds that the science fiction of yesterday is about to become science proper 
and embraces an utterly naturalized understanding of human existence. The name ‘trans-humanism’ 
indicates that the human in its current form is viewed as a transitory being, whose purpose it is to 
overcome its limitations. The movements’ central tenet is that we should use our growing 
technological prowess to far surpass current biological constraints and engineer ourselves towards a 
state of increased ability, intelligence, sophistication and longevity. Although this prospect is greatly 
reminiscent of familiar scenarios from the world of science fiction, the notion that it may soon 
become our everyday reality strikes most people as improbable, strange, alienating or uncanny. 
Nevertheless, transhumanist ideas have become widely discussed and bioethical debates in 
particular can not avoid thinking earnestly about the possibility of radically modifying humans. The 
term Human Enhancement Technologies (HET) has become the rubric under which questions of our 
imminent technological self-manipulation are mainly dealt with.  
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Convergence Towards Enhancement 
 
Humanity has always used culture-specific methods and practices to increase the capacities and 
extend the limits of human biology. These methods can range from the use of substances like 
caffeine or gingko, through the creation and application of increasingly complex tools, up to 
systematic ways of disciplining and educating the mind and the body. In a certain sense the entire 
process of cultural development can be understood as a series of attempts to overcome natural 
human limitations. However, in our present age the never ending quest to better the human 
condition seems to have reached a crucial turning point. The convergence of the fields of 
Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information technology and Cognitive Science seems to enable 
previously unimaginable degrees of intervention into matter, into life processes and into human 
nature. Convergence denotes the increasing cooperation, methodological exchange and general 
union of the mentioned four scientific disciplines. Its proponents depict the convergence of sciences 
and technologies as a much needed unification of knowledge-seeking endeavours after many years 
of disciplinary separation. Following a programmatic document published by the U.S. National 
Science Foundation in 2002 the approach has also been dubbed NBIC.1 It has a rather clearly 
defined orientation towards enhancement, which is evidenced by the following statement: “At this 
moment in the evolution of technical achievement, improvement of human performance through 
integration of technologies becomes possible.” 
Also, recent biomedical advances are blurring the lines between therapeutic and enhancing 
interventions on the human body. The best illustration of this process is perhaps the controversial 
case of Oscar Pistorius, the “fastest man on no legs”. The double-amputee athlete with prosthetic 
legs, Pistorius wanted to compete in the 2008 Beijing Olympics but the IAAF initially ruled him 
ineligible because an independent study concluded “that cheetah prosthetics offer clear mechanical 
advantages”2 over healthy individuals. This ruling was later reversed and Pistorius could have 
entered the games had he managed to run the required qualifying time, which he failed by 0.7 
seconds. His case demonstrates how hard it is to untangle dis-ability from super-ability in the age of 
advanced prosthetics. 
It is thus gradually becoming possible to use biotechnological means not just to cure diseases or 
ameliorate suffering but also to improve upon normal, healthy functioning. Some have even 
                                                 
1
 Rocco M. C., Bainbridge W.S., (eds.), ‘Converging Technologies for Improving Human  
Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive Science’ NSF/DOC-sponsored 
report, 2002. URL: http://www.wtec.org/ConvergingTechnologies/1/NBIC_report.pdf Last retrieved: 21 August 
2010 
2
 Oscar Pistorius - Independent Scientific study concludes that cheetah prosthetics offer clear mechanical advantages,  
Website of the International Association of Athletics Federations, 14 January 2008 
http://www.iaaf.org/news/kind=101/newsid=42896.html Last retrieved 20 August 2010 
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suggested that we are at the threshold of a new biomedical paradigm that involves a transition from 
restitutio ad integrum to transformatio ad optimum as the chief medical concern.3 Given the facts 
that universal health insurance is not a global phenomenon yet and that millions of people die each 
year of easily preventable diseases this claim might sound grotesquely preposterous. Nevertheless 
the trend towards and “enhancement medicine” are starting to take shape in developed Western 
countries. Furthermore, a number of enhancements in the future are likely to be spin-offs or “side 
effects” of mainstream biomedical research, as the case of Pistorius demonstrates.  
Projected breakthroughs in genetics, nanotechnology, stem cell therapy, human-computer 
interfaces and psychopharmacology are currently the subjects of great hope and hype but have also 
provoked significant anxieties and strong resistance. Because the impact of these developments is 
potentially profound, the turn of the 21st century has seen the emergence of heated philosophical,4 
ethical,5 legal6 and other discussions concerning the appropriate use of these technologies. 
 Does ‘human nature’ possess some form of binding normativity that would preclude 
technological modifications aimed at improvement?7 Are we victims of a morally questionable 
‘drive to mastery’ that needs to be overcome?8 Would human enhancement lead to a new form of 
eugenics, the breeding of superior people and thus fundamentally upset the social and political 
order?9 Or, to the contrary, is it perhaps the case that we may need to think about enhancements as 
somehow levelling out the distribution of capacities; could enhancements serve the purpose of 
more, rather than less equality and fairness?10 Might we even have a moral obligation to enhance?11 
 In the year 2000, four leading U.S. bioethicists published a book under the title From 
Chance to Choice – Genetics and Justice, in which they analyzed the challenges posed by recent 
biotechnological developments to ethical reasoning and distributive justice.12  The four words, from 
chance to choice perfectly express and bring to the point a crucial issue that lies at the heart of 
current technoscientific developments. One might only want to add a question mark at the end. 
While new possibilities seem to expand the domain of human agency and choice to fundamental 
                                                 
3
 See Wiesing, U., The History of Medical Enhancement: From Restitutio ad Integrum to Transformatio ad Optimum?, 
in Medical Enhancement and Posthumanity, Springer Netherlands, 2009. pp. 25-37. 
4
 Bailley, H. W., Casey, T., K., Is Human Nature Obsolete? – Genetics, Bioengineering and the Future of the Human 
Condition, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 2005. 
5
 The President’s Council on Bioethics, BeyondTtherapy – Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness, URL: 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/beyondtherapy/beyond_therapy_final_webcorrected.pdf Last retrieved 
20 August 2010 
6
 Wienke, A., Eberbach, W., H., Kramer, H.J., Janke, K., (eds.) Die Verbesserung des Menschen – Tatsächliche und 
rechtliche Aspekte der wunscherfüllenden Medizin, Springer, Heidelberg, 2009. 
7
 Habermas, J., (2003) The Future of Human Nature. Polity Press, Cambridge 
8
 Sandel, M., The Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering. Harvard University Press, 2007. 
9
 Fukuyama, F., Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. Picador, New York, 2002. 
10
 Buchanan, A., Brock, D., Daniels, N., Wikler, D., From Chance to Choice – Genetics and Justice. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2000. 
11
 Harris J., Enhancing Evolution, 2007. Princeton University Press. 
12
 Buchanan, et al. op cit. 
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biological levels, they may also be seen as means for inscribing power relations and the status quo 
of social expectations and ideals ever deeper in the body.  
 There is thus a broad spectrum of opinions concerning the desirability and the limitations of 
new technologies. Whereas some consider them to be nothing more than new and more 
sophisticated means for treating and preventing disease, for others, these developments hold out the 
promise of exchanging the chance of the natural lottery for free human choice, thus liberating us 
from the burdens of our biological determination. Enthusiastic voices speak of radically enhanced 
humans, indefinitely expanded life spans and the creation of superhuman artificial intelligence. The 
position of those eagerly embracing these prospects could be called progressive technoeuphoric, 
while conservative technophobia is characterized by the fear that our technological hubris might 
make us lose the essence of what it means to be human.  
Transhumanist thinkers are perhaps the most ardent supporters of enhancement technologies. 
They argue that emerging technologies and future artificial intelligence will allow us to greatly 
extend the human lifespan and to radically alter, or even transcend the human condition altogether, 
possibly ushering in a post-biological era.13 In their view, this emancipation from the confines and 
injustice of the natural lottery would result in the emergence of the ’posthuman’ – a being that is 
vastly superior to humans and exhibits total control over its own physical, intellectual and 
emotional capacities. Interestingly, the literal merger of man and technology, and ultimately the 
replacement of humans by posthumans are considered to manifest the true unfolding and fulfilment 
of human potentials, as if the purpose of being human had always been self-transcendence. A 
consideration of different varieties of posthumanism will be a significant part of this thesis. 
Because contemporary bioethical debates revolve around the forms of legitimate 
intervention into life processes they unavoidably include making judgments about the value of 
certain forms and ways of life, and ultimately about what it means to be human, or to live a 
meaningful life. These dilemmas and meditations over what man can, may and should make of 
himself are the most contemporary struggles with the question Kant considered to be the ultimate 
matter of philosophy: “What is man?” 
 
Thesis Structure / Thesis Outline 
 
The present work addresses the question of enhancement technologies in three steps. The first 
chapter will give a brief overview of the history of ideas pertaining to efforts at making better 
people. This historical reconstruction will also identify major philosophical currents and intellectual 
antecedents of transhumanist thought.  
                                                 
13
 Kurzweil, R., The Singularity is Near. Penguin Books, New York, 2005. 
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The second chapter Drawing on literature from both the philosophy of technology and 
science and technology studies I try to outline a critique of the foundational assumptions this debate 
rests upon. The heart of the critique is that both ardent opponents of enhancement and enthusiastic 
supporters embrace an idea about the relationship between human nature and technology that is 
largely untenable. Whereas some argue in favour of a strict separation of human nature from a 
perceived impure technological impingement others jubilate the arrival of „liberation biology”.14 
Yet, both positions seem to relate to technology as if it were something external and look at its 
application to humans either with fear or joyous expectation. Instead of this clear separation I argue 
with Haraway, Hayles and others that technology shapes, mediates and intimately permeates our 
lives; in an especially succinct formulation „what we make and what (we think) we are co-evolve 
together”.15 Our relation to technologies is thus not evident and univocal but highly ambiguous and 
ambivalent. Emerging technologies shall likely neither strip us of our ‘humanness’ nor makes us 
absolute masters of our destiny but entangle us in ever complexer relations. 
 The final chapter then attempts to sketch some features of this ambivalence using mainly 
genetic technologies as examples. The three aspects I am going to discuss concern on the one hand 
the undoubtedly liberating potential of these technologies as biology becomes more open to 
intervention and choice. Yet, simultaneously there are at least two tendencies that provide reason to 
be cautious. First, there is a lot that suggests that the augmentation of human characteristics as well 
as the possible creation of species-untypical traits may become subsumed under the logic of 
perpetual performance enhancement driven by competition and consumerism. Second, the 
advancement of sophisticated diagnostic and monitoring tools increasingly gives rise to screening, 
preventive and pre-emptive measures. This suggests that the enhanced human body will be a 
thoroughly monitored, surveilled and highly normalized body. The aspired unfolding of human 
potentials may thus harbour far more stratification and control than enthusiasts recognize. 
 Hence, the thesis starts from a description of visions of human perfectibility, proceeds 
through an analysis of the contemporary debates about posthumanism and ends with a consideration 
of current biopolitical trends that may give us an idea about likely developments in the future.  
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Bailey, R., Liberation Biology: The Scientific and Moral Case for the Biotech Revolution, 2005., Prometheus Books, 
New York 
15
 Hayles, K. N.,‘Unfinished Work: From Cyborg to Cognisphere’, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 23, July, 2006. p. 
164. 
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 - Chapter 1 -  
 
How Human Enhancement Came To Be 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
In this chapter I will sketch the history of ideas pertaining to human enhancement understood in a 
rather broad sense. It shall provide an overview of different attempts at improving humans, 
achieving perfection and longevity. It will recount the story of Western philosophy's intimate 
relationship with efforts aimed at improving humans. It is also a fascinating story of great 
ambivalence that depicts humans simultaneously as utterly deficient creatures who are condemned 
to a life of misery, pain and a meagre existence flowing from their very nature, yet who are also 
capable of endlessly changing, manipulating and perfecting everything around them, including 
themselves. As almost all historical reconstructions my attempt certainly makes no claim to being 
exhaustive. It shall rather outline the transformation of the idea of manipulating and improving 
humanity by different means as described in a variety of genres ranging from utopian fiction 
through political campaigns up to our present day debates where Human Enhancement 
Technologies have become a mainstream topic within bioethical discourse, they feature prominently 
in popular culture and often make it to the news headlines. In a certain sense, this chapter makes an 
attempt at tracing the genealogy and intellectual antecedents of current techno-optimistic positions, 
such as transhumanism.  
  
Forever Young – Myths and Alchemy  
 
Mortality, the fleeting and ephemeral nature of human existence has prompted cultures of all times 
and places to reflect upon the possibility of lengthening life. It is certainly impossible to recount 
here all the different conceptions and attitudes towards death as the spectrum of opinions is 
extremely broad. It ranges from the view that earthly life itself is merely transitory, with death 
signalling the entry into an infinitely more important eternal afterlife, through the notion that with 
the death of the body life ceases altogether, to the view that by the application of proper methods – 
magical, scientific or spiritual – human life and vitality can be indefinitely extended. Death can be 
seen as an unavoidable fact of human existence that is to be met with dignity or as the unacceptable 
limitation of human endeavours, which must be conquered or at least contested. 
 Man's quest for longevity and immortality has featured prominently in a number of myths 
and mystical traditions such as the well known ancient Greek parable of Tithonus whose tragic fate 
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was sealed when Zeus granted him eternal life but not eternal youth. The Epic of Gilgamesh is 
among the oldest written records of human history and a significant portion of this Mesopotamian 
poem describes the pursuits of the heroic demigod king Gilgamesh as he attempts to attain 
immortality by gaining hold of a special plant that grows at the bottom of the sea and possesses the 
magical power of rejuvenation. After many misadventures Gilgamesh manages to gather the plant 
but in the end it is snatched away from him by a serpent leaving him mortal like all other men.16 
According to the epic, this is the reason why snakes have attained the ability to shed their skins and 
live long lives. The story may be read either as an expression of man's deeply rooted longing for 
eternal youth or as an allegory of the futility and misplaced nature of such attempts. 
 In a long chapter of his seminal work A History of Ideas about the Prolongation of Life 
Gerald Gruman has collected stories, myths, and religious and philosophical theories that in one 
way or another testify to the impossibility, undesirability or outright immoral nature of attempting 
to overcome mortality. Gruman subsumed these accounts under the heading „apologism” for they 
all seek to somehow render acceptable the facts of ageing, decline and death. After a detailed 
description of relevant theories Gruman summarizes the grounds on which the prolongation of life 
has been opposed. He uses the term prolongevity, which is defined as „the significant extension of 
the length of life by human action” and lists the following 6 types of arguments against it:17 
− Prolongevity is ruled out by inherent defects in human nature. 
− Prolongevity is a violation of the natural order 
− Prolongevity violates the divine order 
− Prolongevity is ruled out by original sin 
− Prolongevity is of itself undesirable 
− Old age and death are desirable 
Remarkable about this set of arguments is that it has remained fairly constant over millennia albeit 
there have also been some more recent additions to the list of counterarguments. Even though 
average life expectancy has witnessed tremendous change the argument that adding deliberately to 
the number of life years is problematic still seems convincing to many. Arguments directed against 
life extension still make recourse to the naturalness and desirability of death and old age as evident 
and unchanging features of life.18  
 As opposed to apologist myths and thinkers like Aristotle, Marcus Aurelius or Thomas 
Aquinas who rejected prolongevity Gruman devotes most of his attention to what he calls 
„meliorist” theories. This approach does note take illness, ageing, decline and death as natural and 
                                                 
16
 Gruman, G., J., A History of Ideas about the Prolongation of Life, Springer Publishing Company, 2003. 
17
 Ibid. p. 26-27 
18
 Kass, L, Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity, 2004. Encounter Books 
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unalterable givens but attempts to overcome them. The contemporary transhumanist movement 
stands clearly in this meliorist line of thought that can look back at a long history even though it 
would certainly be mistaken to lump together undifferentiated all the meliorist efforts. 
 At about the same time when Aristotle and Epicurus were active in the West Taoism began 
to burgeon in China. Compared to the Greek thinkers who had a clear apologist orientation in 
relation to prolongevity the philosophy/religion of Taoism was explicitly concerned with 
lengthening life. To this end it employed different mystical techniques, alchemist practices and a 
general philosophy of quietism, of preserving one’s life-forces by acting effortlessly and in perfect 
harmony with nature. The prolongation of life and ultimately immortality were thus inherent parts 
of this tradition and seen as a sign of sagehood. In later centuries an institutionalized Taoist church 
even prescribed prolongevity practices to all of its members. Though Taoism went into decline 
following the 12th century it has played a crucial and lasting influence on Chinese culture and its 
naturalistic alchemist practices represent valuable proto-scientific undertakings that have also 
influenced the West through Arab transmission.19  As Gruman notes, Taoism was the very first 
systematic attempt to attain longevity that was nevertheless greatly hindered by lack of organization 
and a form of primitivism that sought return to a past golden age.20 
 In the West the first figure to stress the desirability of prolonging life was 13th century 
philosopher and alchemist Roger Bacon who explicitly distanced himself from the merely health 
oriented attitude of Galenic medicine and sought more radical means.  
Alchemists were the bearers of an arcane knowledge that with the works of Paracelsus later 
evolved into scientific chemistry. They sought to create an elixir of life or what has been called the 
Philosopher’s Stone that was also capable of transmuting metals into gold. Alchemy was a highly 
secretive art and its followers were men and women who came from all walks of life and who 
adhered to different faiths, Moslems, Christians and Jews. It was a controversial activity to engage 
in alchemist practices as it was sometimes tolerated or even exploited by courts and kings and at 
other times pursued as a form of heresy.  
One of the alchemists’ methods of obtaining the purest substance of all was through 
distillation and the separation of the pure from the impure. This refinement or transmutation can 
take on many different meanings as it also refers to the production of a perfect thing than can 
bestow this perfection on everything else, thus also eliminating all forms of suffering.21  
The theoretical foundation of alchemy was greatly influenced by Aristotelian natural 
philosophy. It was believed that the world consisted of four elements – earth, air, fire and water – 
                                                 
19
 Gruman, op. cit. p 80. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Moran, B., T., Distilling Knowledge – Alchemiy, Chemistry and the Scientific Revolution, Harvard University Press, 
2005.  p. 24. 
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which in turn were made up of 4 qualities: hot, cold, wet and dry. By manipulating the qualities it 
was possible to transmute elements and thus things themselves.22 An explicitly Aristotelian 
influence was the idea expressed for example in the first sentence of the Nichomachean Ethics that 
all things aimed for perfection.23 Within alchemy this natural striving for perfection was recognized 
in the way that elements too strived for their purest form even if left untouched. Alchemists thought 
to catalyze this otherwise very slow process of natural purification and then confer this perfection 
upon humans.  
The most famous alchemists were Bacon, John of Rupescissa and Raymond Lull.24 Bacon 
often referred to the theme of antediluvian people who lived for centuries. From this he concluded 
that the currently reduced lifespan must not be fixed and unalterable but due to improper hygiene, 
immorality and no knowledge of the secret art of life extension.25 Bacon had no idealistic thoughts 
about growing old and falling into slow decline, however, because he was a devout Christian he did 
not believe that immortality was attainable for humans. He merely sought to return to what he 
considered to be the normal lifespan of humans, which he estimated to comprise many centuries of 
vitality. 
Interestingly, Bacon was also a proponent of a form ‘degeneration theory’ that will be a 
central theme when I come to a discussion of eugenics. Bacon believed that bad habits and poor 
hygiene diminished one’s health and that this acquired trait was heritable such that succeeding 
generations not only received bad habits but also a weakened constitution.26  
There is a remarkable similarity between the things Taoists and alchemists held to be of life 
extending quality. Such things include “[…] pearls, coral, rosemary, aloe wood, the flesh of 
serpents, ambergris, gold, […]”.27Based on reasoning by analogy they assumed that those things 
that themselves were long-lived or otherwise “perfect” had the power to lend this quality to other 
entities. Similarly, just as disease was known to be contagious, the mere vicinity of healthy and 
especially young virgin women was thought to rejuvenate and further health.28 
 Later, as the natural sciences began to burgeon and chemistry as a distinct approach 
attempted to solidify itself alchemy became discredited.29 Figures closely associated with the rise of 
natural science also held that the prolongation of life was not only possible but also desirable. 
Francis Bacon thought for example that technological progress might enable mankind to regain 
their original purity both of thought and action that they possessed before the expulsion from the 
                                                 
22
 Ibid. p. 26. 
23
 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Batoche Books, 1991., p. 3. 
24
 Lull was also important forerunner of the idea of mechanizing thought in his Ars Magna. 
25
 Gruman op. cit. p. 107. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. p. 110. 
28
 Ibid. p. 111. 
29
 Moran, B., op. Cit. 
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Garden of Eden.30 Though this would not have meant immortality but certainly a considerably 
extended lifespan.  
 
The Birth of Eugenics in Plato   
 
Already at the dawn of the history of Western philosophy we find an elaborate depiction of a 
utopian society, which is ordered according to the highest principles of Justice and the Good. In the 
Republic Plato sums up his views on metaphysics, the nature of the soul, ethics and politics and 
describes an ideal form of social organization. The central question of the work concerns the issue 
of justice and how a perfectly just society can be erected. Plato considers the functioning of the 
ideal state to be inseparable from the proper functioning of the individuals who comprise it. An 
analogous relationship exists between the structure of the state and the constitution of its 
inhabitants. In Plato’s organicist model, just at the soul is considered to consists of three parts – 
reasoned, spirited and appetitive – so too does the ideal state comprise three classes of citizens who 
are mainly defined by the dominance of either soul part. Justice prevails if each soul part and 
correspondingly each class can exhibit its specific virtue and fulfil its proper role at a destined place 
within the social fabric.  Philosopher kings, who are endowed with wisdom are destined to rule for 
they have gained insight into the world of ideas and possess the requisite knowledge to guide the 
polis. They are supported by auxiliary guardians whose defining characteristic is courage and their 
dominant soul part is the spirited one. The lowest class of merchants and labourers are defined by 
the appetitive soul part whose destiny it is to obey rulers and guardians, yet the material foundation 
of society depends on their work. In order to ensure this strict and static social hierarchy the 
reproduction of the upper classes is carefully monitored and guided by the republic in order to 
ensure superior births.31  
 Thus Plato, drawing on metaphors of animal breeding has given a detailed account of a 
state-run eugenics programme many centuries before Galton had systematically developed the idea. 
His views on state-controlled reproduction have anticipated significant elements of all later 
eugenics programmes, including the rhetoric of fear from degeneration if reproduction remains 
unchecked and state intervention to further the bearers of the most desirable and hinder those with 
the least desirable traits to reproduce.32 
 By giving such a simplified and condensed account of Plato's infinitely more complex 
theory I wanted merely to highlight the peculiar fact that developing detailed accounts and 
arguments in favour of controlling reproduction according certain societal goals has been an 
                                                 
30
 Dusek, V., Philosophy of Technology, Blackwell Publishing, 2006. 
31
 Häyry, M., he Historical Idea of a Better Race,Studies in Ethics, Law, and Technology, Volume 2, Issue 1, 2008. pp. 
32
 See for example Plato, The Rebuplic, V 459a-459b. 
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imminent part of Western intellectual history ever since its inception. In a somewhat acrimonious 
paraphrase of Whitehead's famous sentence, one might even say that the Western „tradition” of 
eugenics consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. 
 
Humanism and Perfectibility 
 
Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola's 1486 Oration on the Dignity Of Men serves as a central historical 
reference. Mirandola can be credited for formulating the idea that human beings are ultimately 
shapeable, without any assigned and ultimate nature.  
We have given you, Oh Adam, no visage proper to yourself, nor any endowment properly 
your own, in order that whatever place, whatever form, whatever gifts you may, with 
premeditation, select, these same you may have and possess through your own judgment and 
decision. The nature of all other creatures is defined and restricted within laws which We 
have laid down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such restrictions, may, by your own free 
will, to whose custody We have assigned you, trace for yourself the lineaments of your own 
nature . . . We have made you a creature neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor 
immortal, in order that you may, as the free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion 
yourself in the form you may prefer.33  
In light of this, man appears as a creature characterized essentially by its freedom to mould itself 
into whatever form it wishes. However, humans seem to be torn between the world of low beasts on 
the one hand – which can be equated with instincts, with the body, or with biology – and the world 
of divine intellect on the other hand. Being human means existing at the interface of these 
overwhelming forces. As implicated by Mirandola the truly worthy path for humans to pursue is the 
one, which surpasses brutish forms of life. This understanding of man’s nature as unfixed and 
shapeable is one of the major sources of contemporary techno-optimism coupled with the belief that 
our “brutish”, animal-like life needs to be transcended. This side of our existence is increasingly 
equated with biological constraints in general. 
 About 100 years after Mirandola natural sciences began to burgeon and make some progress 
into the realization of this vision. The sciences had given rise to the idea that it was possible to 
study, understand and influence nature. This has signalled an important transition from the formerly 
highly influential Aristotelian notion that man’s techne merely imitated nature. The new idea 
considered nature to be something uncharted and unknown that now lies ready to be studied and 
manipulated according to man’s desires.34 Francis Bacon, who is often credited with being the 
father of modern natural science and the developer of the inductive method of reasoning held that 
science held great values for society and in his utopia The New Atlantis he depicted a community of 
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scientists that closely resembles modern research universities. His ideas have greatly contributed to 
the foundation of the Royal Society. 
 Another figure closely associated with early science who considered perfectibility an 
imminent possibility was Descartes. He was quite explicit on the issue establishing a link between 
the prolongation of life, improving faculties and medicine in effect conceptualizing life extension as 
the postponement of death, which is exactly the way current technoprogressives think of the issue. 
[…] it would be possible to be free of innumerable illnesses of both body and mind, and 
perhaps even the decline of old age, if we knew enough about their causes and the remedies 
with which nature has provided us. […] For even the mind depends so much on the 
temperament and disposition of the organs of the body that, if it is possible to find some way 
of making men in most cases wiser and more skilful than they have been hitherto I believe 
that it is in medicine that it must be sought.35 
A particularly controversial figure was the physician Julien Offray de La Mettrie who is most well 
known for his book L’homme machine from 1748. His utterly consistent mechanistic materialism 
has earned him two exiles and an eternal fame in the history of philosophy. He took a more radical 
view than Descartes in reducing even the mind to workings of matter and suggesting that man 
himself was a machine. He had done away with all the previous metaphysical assumptions that 
rationalists had relied upon to guarantee truth and morality and La Mettrie embraced a complete 
physicalism.36 It would be gross exaggeration to say that such views were generally held at the time, 
which is evidenced by the fact that La Mettrie got banished from two countries for his views. 
Rather, it signals the gradual transition towards a naturalized understanding of human nature that 
also gradually transformed notions of an immaterial soul into an equally mysterious but in principle 
understandable mind.37 
Thus gradually the proper utilization of man’s intellect was perceived to be the only 
prerequisite for achieving a harmonious society and subduing nature. Faith in the improvability of 
the human body was perhaps most emphatically voiced by the Marquis de Condorcet, who regarded 
the scope of perfectibility to be infinite.38  
Transhumanism considers itself to be an extension of this tradition, and commitment to 
Enlightenment values has been repeatedly expressed by a number of authors.39  
 
Eugenic Perfection and the Rise of the Future 
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The birth of the theory of evolution in the 19th century provided enormous impetus to the project of 
naturalization and served as an enormous assault on the self-understanding of man. Evolution 
degraded the status of man to that of a mere descendant of the animal kingdom whose nature had 
been shaped by a long series of chance events. Besides destabilizing previous understandings the 
theory of evolution also provided a new way of looking at the future of mankind. It opened the 
possibility of consciously guiding the course of development. 
In 1883 Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin coined the word eugenics, meaning 
„noble in heredity”.40 The science of eugenics, which was meant to improve the human stock by 
selectively breeding the suitable and preventing the same to the less fit, spread quickly around the 
world, with institutes being established in Europe, Russia, Australia and the United States. Galton 
proposed that eugenics allowed mankind to take control of its own evolution.41 Eugenicists in the 
early 20th century were mainly concerned about the gradual degeneration and impoverishment of 
the human gene pool. The concept of degeneration has a multifaceted origin. On the one hand 
Bénédict-Auguste Morel a French psychiatrist of the mid-19th century and an enthusiastic supporter 
of the first form of biological psychiatry launched the concept on its fateful trajectory. At the time 
the belief was that major mental illnesses not only had a strong genetic component, meaning that 
they ran in families, but also that the illnesses progressively got worse as they were passed on.42 
Thus 19th century worries of the degeneration of the populace loomed high. Degenerates – who 
were often identified with the morally condemned homosexuals, onanists and premature 
ejaculators43 - were seen as the losers and deficient figures in the evolutionary battle for survival. 
Yet, their procreation was considered a social problem.  
Degeneracy is more than an individual disease, it is a social menace: It is important to combat 
it with a rigorous form of social hygiene. One must not forget that the degenerate is often a 
dangerous individual against whom society should and must reserve the right to protect 
itself.44 
Even though the notion of mental illness progressively getting worse with succession of generations 
had become largely discredited within psychiatry by the time of the end of the First World War, as 
Shorter says, “the genie was out of the bottle” and the concept unfolded its sinister effects 
elsewhere. In fact, degeneracy was not just an issue of psychiatry. This burgeoning field was merely 
a prominent site were the issue came up, but degeneracy was perceived as the key to all social 
problems including poverty, criminality, etc. Socio-biology advocated by such figures as Herbert 
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Spencer held that “Under the natural order of things society is constantly excreting its unhealthy, 
imbecile, slow, vacillating, faithless members”.45 It was therefore necessary not to hinder this 
natural process of purification. Interestingly, nature is elevated to a standard for society on this 
account. Eugenics went a step further and advocated that certain measures be taken to halt 
degeneration on the one hand, and improve the stock on the other. However, for such authors as 
Galton positive eugenics was far more superior and important than negative. “The possibility of 
improving the race of a nation depends on the power of increasing the productivity of the best stock. 
This is far more important than that of repressing the productivity of the worst.”46 
 Eugenics had reached its highpoint during the era of National Socialism in Germany, which 
simultaneously represents the deepest abyss mankind has ever descended to. It was a time when the 
promotion of the breeding of certain „races” and the extermination of others was elevated to the 
central concern of politics. As we shall see later in this chapter eugenics did not fade after the 
World War II. A number of authors propagated it and the practice continued in the form of 
compulsory sterilizations up until the 3rd quarter of the 20th century in a number of developed and 
democratic countries.47 
In a certain sense the rise of the eugenics movement, but already before that the notion of 
degeneration had signalled an important transformation. As Laure Cartron observes – drawing on 
Foucault – during the 18th and 19th centuries the relevance of genealogy had been supplanted by that 
of heredity. With this change a new dimension seemed to have entered life, and began to be 
contemplated, namely that of the future. Parallel to this the child as such emerged as an important 
concern which bore the seeds of the coming society.48 The emergence of the future as an issue is 
also suggested by the fact that the first time-utopia was also published in 1771. Mercer’s work is the 
first in the genre of utopian literature that does not locate the utopian society at a distinct place but 
in the writer’s own future thereby adding new dynamism to the concept.49 Also, Michel Foucault 
said of Kant’s short piece “What is Enlightenment?” to be the first philosophical work calling for a 
reflection on the present. 50Who are we in the present? Kant’s answer to the question concerning the 
Enlightenment is also one directed at the future, namely it is an „exit” leading us out of our 
immaturity. 
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Before I continue with the discussion of utopian projects aimed at improving mankind I want to 
briefly turn to Kant’s philosophy of history and some of the tensions inherent to it. I believe it is of 
great relevance for the present topic. 
 
Philosophy of History – From Kant to Cosmism 
 
An elemental tension that permeates the philosophy of Immanuel Kant is that between human 
freedom and the purposiveness of nature. From this tension emerges the question concerning the 
purposive progression of history. Kant attempts to reconcile the postulate of human freedom with 
the idea of the necessary development of all natural capacities to their natural end. The question is 
whether and how it were possible to find a natural purpose in this fabric of history that is „in the 
large woven together from folly, childish vanity, even from childish malice and destructiveness.”51 
In light of this natural purpose it might be possible to find some plan behind „this idiotic course of 
things human.”52 Were we not to make this assumption, so Kant, then we would have to rectify 
ourselves with the thought that the otherwise so obvious „majesty and wisdom of Creation” would 
make the history of man, which contained the purpose of the whole a „contemptible plaything.”53 
Besides the problem of the freedom of man and the purposiveness of nature, which Kant attempts to 
reconcile with each other he is also at pains to rescue a certain conception of man’s exceptional 
position in the grand scheme of things. This position is greatly challenged by the seeming 
meaninglessness of history. Kant supposes that within nature everything is destined to reach the 
fullest development of its end. In the case of man this development concerns reason. Thus the 
postulated natural purpose would imply that the history of man by necessity lead to the full 
development of reason. This will manifest itself in the establishment of a perfect civic constitution, 
the rule of law and a society of world citizenship that is ordered according to the principles of 
reason. However, as Kant notes in the second thesis of his Idea for a Universal History from a 
Cosmopolitan Point of View, “In man (as the only rational creature on earth) those natural capacities 
which are directed to the use of his reason are to be fully developed only in the race, not in the 
individual.”54 This means that the end – in the sense of purpose – of mankind can only be the result 
of a long and laborious process of bringing forth that capacity that resides in our species. Kant then 
goes on to add in the third thesis that 
Nature has willed that man should, by himself, produce everything that goes beyond the 
mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should partake of no other happiness 
or perfection than that which he himself, independently of instinct, has created by his own 
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reason.55 
Kant has adopted the notion of the state of nature from the French Enlightenment. For the Prussian 
thinker the concept does not denote any historical period but rather a certain methodological starting 
point for further reflection. Natural man possesses no social attributes. She is neither free nor 
unfree, neither moral nor immoral. In a certain sense, natural man for Kant is like an animal, with 
one crucial difference however. Man is a transitory being – in a sense a bridge as Nietzsche will say 
later. Man bears the potential of development within himself. As Kant says man is like a crooked 
timber that needs to be straightened through the process of civilizing and cultivating. 
Developing a detailed analysis of Kant’s concept of nature would certainly exceed the scope 
of this thesis. I merely want to point to certain ambivalence. On the one hand it is nature that “has 
willed” the development of human capacities. This development constitutes the already mentioned 
plan of nature according to which every capacity must by necessity reach its natural end. However, 
on the other hand nature in the form of brutish, instinctive, natural existence must be overcome and 
surpassed.  
The above quoted passage thus points to a fundamental dichotomy that became quite 
constitutive of the self-conception of man in the West. Namely the opposition between the world of 
nature and the world of free human affairs and reason. By defining man as animal rationabile Kant 
has defined the essence of being human as something processual and stressed the dialectical tension 
spanned between nature and being human. Man is the animal that can become rational. In this sense 
being human consists in the fulfilment of the task of overcoming our internal instinctual part and 
unfolding reason. 
These two claims, the second and the third thesis lead to a grave problem of the Kantian 
philosophy of history that, as we shall see also played role in biopolitical utopias later to come. The 
problem concerns the massive injustice implicated by the fact that only the human race but not the 
individual can achieve the fullest development of its potentials. According to Kant 
It remains strange that the earlier generations appear to carry through their toilsome labour 
only for the sake of the later, to prepare for them a foundation on which the later generations 
could erect the higher edifice which was Nature’s goal, and yet that only the latest of the 
generations should have the good fortune to inhabit the building on which a long line of their 
ancestors had (unintentionally) labored without being permitted to partake of the fortune they 
had prepared.56 
Yet, we must find a way to cope with this injustice, otherwise it would remain impossible to stick to 
the assumption that “a class of rational beings each of whom dies while the species is immortal, 
should develop their capacities to perfection.”57 In order to illustrate the unfolding of the natural 
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plan inherent to history Kant reverts to a rather interesting example.  
marriages, births, and deaths, they seem to be subject to no rule by which the number of them 
could be reckoned in advance. Yet the annual tables of them in the major countries prove that 
they occur according to laws as stable as [those of] the unstable weather, which we likewise 
cannot determine in advance, but which, in the large, maintain the growth of plants the flow 
of rivers, and other natural events in an unbroken uniform course.58 
This example is far from accidental, because it was precisely during Kant’s lifetime that political 
arithmetic and the search for laws and regularities in big collected databases began to blossom. One 
of the leading statisticians of the time with whom Kant also corresponded was Johann Peter 
Süssmilch. He believed that in his main work The Divine order in the changes in the human sex 
from birth, death and reproduction of the same he had demonstrated that the purpose of the divine 
creator could have been none other than that of making man, who was endowed with reason the 
ruler of the entire Earth.59 He set out to show that the divine order was manifest in the arithmetic 
description of the way human demographics changed over time. However, he also believed the ruler 
of the state to be the earthly resident of the divine order and as such had to intervene in processes of 
reproduction. 
 According to Dorothy Porter Süssmilch represented an important figure in the transition 
from what Foucault called sovereign power to biopower and to the gradual taking hold of the 
biological life of the population by the state.60 It is interesting to see some connections between this 
development and Kant’s idea that the fullest maturation of capacities is only possible in the species 
and more importantly that this development was connected to the establishment of a certain form of 
state. 
 So while Kant supposed that history had a necessary progression he also thought that by 
recognizing the end towards which it progressed it was possible to contribute to it. In a certain 
sense, history became something that man could and should partake in and “do”.61  
This notion of history as something ‘doable’ by man in some sense is present in a number of 
thinkers from Rousseau through Kant. However, the notion reached its culmination in the 
philosophy of Karl Marx. For Marx the focus of inquiry shifted and it was no longer of prime 
importance to provide a philosophical reading of the history of man as was the case by Kant and 
Hegel. The world had to be changed and not merely interpreted.62 Marx presented his theories with 
a strong claim to being scientific however he rejected a fully naturalistic understanding of man. For 
him history so far had consisted of class struggles between the ruling and the oppressed classes. 
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Should class struggle cease with the oppressed proletariat gaining hold of the means of production 
we would find ourselves in a different era.63 This shift in the course of history was later interpreted 
by Engels as the final exit of man from animality.64 It would signal the beginning of an epoch where 
the environment that has hitherto determined mankind would come under his conscious control. As 
Engels wrote:  
The conditions for life, which had previously dominated him, would then be placed under his 
dominion; and only then would man become consciously and in fact the lord of nature: he 
would become master of his own social organization. 
 
Positivism, unbounded faith in progress and social and industrial turmoil of the time but such 
claims can also be understood as a radicalized form of emancipatory aspirations from nature that 
was present in early natural science and in Kantian philosophy as well. In the famous formulation of 
Engels the realization of socialism would mean nothing less than “the ascent of man from the 
kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom”65 It was precisely this ascent that groups of 
intellectuals in Russia before and during the time of revolution set out to achieve. 
 
Russian Cosmism 
 
The vision of final emancipation motivated the biopolitical utopias in the extraordinarily creative 
years shortly before and following the October Revolution. This was a period when a country 
devastated by civil war looked forward to a brighter future. The program of the revolution was 
nothing less than to create a new and higher breed of humans. In the pointed summary of Leon 
Trotsky 
 […]man will set to work on himself, in the pestle and the retort of the chemist. For the first 
time mankind will regard itself as raw material, or at best as a physical and psychic semi-
finished product. Socialism will mean a leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of 
freedom in this sense also, that the man of today, with all his contradictions and lack of 
harmony, will open the road for a new and happier race.66 
The desired goal was to take the historical power of the proletariat that had finally been set free and 
submit it to systematic and scientific work and elaboration. Science, technology, education and state 
management were to join together and bring about the new man with hitherto unknown powers to 
transform the entire universe. These were among the demands of two utopist groups: God-Builders 
and Biocosmists. Among the members of such groups were highly influential scientists, poets and 
writers, such as Maxim Gorky who was one of the founding members of the group of god-builders, 
or Alexander Bogdanov whose theory of tectology greatly anticipated cybernetics and systems 
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theory. Bogdanov was also working on rejuvenation technologies and life extension methods. He 
thought rejuvenation of the body was possible via blood transfusion from the younger to the older 
generations, which was also seen as an act of social cohesion that strengthened the collective body 
of society. He himself died during such a transfusion. In 1908 Bogdanov published a utopian novel 
that portrayed an idealised socialist state set on Mars.67 The father of Russian space travel and 
rocket science, Konstantin Tsiolkovsky was also a devoted biocosmist whose scientific work was 
motivated by the desire to conquer space and create extraterrestrial colonies.  
The group of biocosmists demanded the right to immortality and interplanetary freedom. 
What is more, Russian futurists envisaged a time in which the whole world, even the entire universe 
would be consciously transformed by the activities of mankind. The central demand of these 
futurists was the abrogation of death. They considered the unjust temporal limitations imposed on 
mankind to be unacceptable. The literal annihilation of all natural differences was considered to be 
the only path leading to a truly just society. It the words of Hagemeister  
There was a widespread expectation that science, art, and technology, freed from the ties of 
conflicting particular interests and for the first time functioning for the benefit of all humanity, 
would take an unprecedented upswing, pave the way for a "bright future," and transcend the 
final barrier blocking the gate to the realm of freedom - human limitations in space and 
time.68 
Besides the obvious influence of Western thinkers these visions possessed genuinely Russian 
characteristics. A main source of inspiration was provided by a thinker called Nikolai Fedorov, the 
father of Russian Cosmism who was mostly neglected and of little influence in his lifetime. In his 
Philosophy of the Common Task Fedorov voiced the necessity of resurrecting all who have died and 
providing immortality to all the living.69 Some of Fedorov’s enthusiastic readers included Vladimir 
Solovyov, one of the greatest figures of Russian philosophy, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky. For Fedorov 
enabling the resurrection of all the dead as well as the conquest of space were the only possible 
solutions to the greatest evil imaginable, namely death.  
Despite Fedorov's invocation of science and technology and his emphasis on abolishing the 
distinction between the learned and the unlearned, his was a special science of the Gnostic 
type and there are definite parallels between his thought and the occult. Fedorov's "common 
task" was like an alchemical Great Work in which transmutation is achieved by science rather 
than the philosopher's stone. He advocated colonizing space to accommodate the increase in 
population when the dead were resurrected, harnessing solar energy, controlling the climate, 
and transforming nature by such means as irrigating Arabia with icebergs hauled from the 
Arctic. He predicted cloning and prosthetic organs (not organ transplants- the resurrected 
would need their organs).70 
The fact that the revolutionary early Soviet intelligentsia set out to realize this grand project of 
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immortalism can be viewed from a number of perspectives.  On the one hand the devastation, the 
enormous backwardness of the country and the poverty and death caused by war and civil war 
demanded a higher form of justification than a mere economical one. The Marxist intelligentsia of 
the time thought purely in terms of economics, however, a mere economical explanation was simply 
not sufficient to justify the immense sacrifices and losses the people had endured. A fraction of the 
intelligentsia endorsed a higher form of justification, namely that of eternal life.71  
On the other hand, Marxism was directly opposed to religion so the question of the 
possibility of redemption also presented itself anew. How was individual immortality to be 
guaranteed when its ontological basis had been dissolved? A practical answer was the technological 
creation of individual bodily immortality.72 
Finally, the promise of immortality can be interpreted in light of the previously discussed 
tension that Kant had observed. Namely, that human capacities could only reach their natural end in 
the species but not in the individual. Russian utopists did not want accept this fact and looked for a 
solution. Since socialism had promised the arrival of an infinitely just society in was deemed 
necessary not only to guarantee immortality to every individual but also to resurrect all previous 
generations such that everyman can share in the benefits of the culmination of the historical 
process.73 
Thus in essence, the finitude of life has been added to the list of problems that the state was 
expected to solve. At about the same time when Martin Heidegger contemplated the existence of 
man in terms of the inevitability of his being-unto-death, a few Russian thinkers demanded personal 
physical immortality as their fundamental human right. This represents the realization of a form of 
power that – in the words of Foucault – not only has the right to „’make’ live and ‘let’ die”74 but one 
that does not even permit death. Proponents of immortalism considered the complete state control 
of life, this total biopower to be the necessary precondition for transcending the limitations of 
humanity and achieving freedom. Full state control and the abolishment of death were seen as 
indispensable for the creation of a truly just communistic society.  
The already mentioned Tsiolkovsky not only embraced immortalism but also espoused a 
radical program of eugenics and intended to do away with all forms of suffering in the entire 
universe. Preventing the reproduction of flawed beings was of crucial importance to him, be they 
unconscious animals, plants or humans deemed imperfect.75 This was a rather peculiar thing at the 
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time because the eugenics movement had only a very brief “blossoming” in Russia and even then 
such radical programs as Tsiolkovsky’s were rather not welcome. One of the reasons for this is that 
the strong reductionism and focus on hereditary factors that characterizes eugenics was 
incompatible with some Marxist theories. This stressed namely the constitutive force of social 
structures as opposed to biological determinants. Hence in Russia a Lamarckian version of the 
theory evolution gained foot and authors stressed the possibility of acquiring new traits during 
lifetime.76 This may have contributed to the justification of “corrective labour camps.” 
Clearly, these biopolitical utopias were embedded into a broad collectivist political vision. In 
1921 Yevgeny Zamyatin’s dystopian novel We articulated a devastating critique of the burgeoning 
totalitarian communist regime.77 Zamyatin depicted an utterly conformist society ruled according to 
scientific principles, where people are reduced to numbers and individuality is completely 
suppressed by the One State. Zamyatin’s novel has greatly influenced Geroge Orwell and probably 
Aldous Huxley as well. 
Some thinkers in Russia even today argue that the philosophy of cosmism has the potential 
pave the way towards the next "divine stage of human development".78 
 
British Biofuturism 
 
In the 1920s’ England such prominent scientists and public figures as John D. Bernal, Julian Huxley 
and John B. S. Haldane have voiced visions that were in a certain sense less radical but otherwise 
very similar to the ideas of their Russian utopist contemporaries. British biofuturists have greatly 
influenced transhumanism and anticipated much of present day debates.79 They propagated the 
scientific enhancement of the evolutionary process and put forth visions of a world where humans 
had over many millennia colonized the universe and radically re-engineered themselves.80 They all 
embraced eugenics as a means of improving the human gene pool even after the Second World War, 
but held that it “must be free of racial and class bias.”81 To different degrees they were all related to 
socialist, Marxist movements of their day and their visions had a tendency towards the kind of 
collectivist utopias characteristic of Russian futurists of the time.  
 Haldane has envisioned a future scenario where the crude methods of earlier eugenics had 
been supplanted by far superior technologies that allowed for the mass manufacture of perfected 
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individuals, thereby effectively replacing motherhood. Haldane foresaw that some would be 
opposed to such applications but he adhered to a rather deterministic notion of technology and held 
that our values adapted to science and not vice-versa.82  
Huxley, Haldane and Bernal articulated the prospect of the unification of mankind under a 
world government run according to scientific principles.83 Such visions have largely motivated 
Aldous Huxley to write Brave New World, a dystopian novel that was meant to reveal the horrors of 
dehumanization brought about by a technocratic totalitarian state that used biotechnology to 
manufacture its citizens.84  
 Haldane and Herman Muller adhered to the usual type of argumentation that society was 
degenerating as a result of our growing medical successes in keeping the originally unfit healthy 
and procreating. They argued furthermore that our increasingly complex world requires us to move 
to higher levels of intelligence otherwise we will not be able to cope. This has become a central 
trope of techno-progressive argumentation that has been repeated often since the last century. 
J. D. Bernal went even further in his visions and even articulated the idea of linking massively 
improved human minds together in a way that individual consciousness would  
vanish in a humanity that has become completely etherealized, losing the close-knit organism, 
becoming masses of atoms in space communicating by radiation, and ultimately perhaps 
resolving entirely into light.85 
 
The Cyborg 
 
The birth of cybernetics in the 1940s as a general theory of communication and control and the 
prospects opened by space travel in the 1960s provided a crucial image that became a central trope 
of transhumanism: the cybernetic organism, or cyborg. Cyberneticists Nathan Kline and Manfred 
Clynes coined to word cyborg in the 1960 article Cyborgs and Space, in which they also discussed 
the coming era of participant evolution.  
The concept of the cyborg was originally meant to describe the technological 
supplementation of man for the purpose of space exploration. The first cyborg was a laboratory rat 
which Clynes and Kline fitted with an osmotic pump that could release chemicals into the animal 
based on its physiological signals. The original idea was that a cybernetic organism was probably 
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much more likely to function well in the inhospitable environment of outer space. It is much easier 
to change man to suit space than the other way around. According to Clynes and Kline the 
cybernetic expansion of man leaves him “free to explore, to create, to think, and to feel.”86 This 
liberation from the constraints of the body is to be achieved with the help of prosthetic extensions 
and supplements. Cybernetics contributed greatly to the conceptualization of man in terms of an 
information processing system. Hence, Clynes and Kline saw new technological possibilities in 
cybernetics that could be employed to free man from bodily constraints. As Katherine Hayles points 
out, despite the fact that cybernetics blurred the distinction between man and machine the 
underlying concept was to a great extent still defined by ideas of the Enlightenment and liberal 
humanism. “For Wiener, cybernetics was a means to extend liberal humanism, not subvert it. The 
point was less to show that man was a machine than to demonstrate that a machine could function 
like a man.”87 Obviously, for most cyberneticists it remained unnoticed that their conceptualizations 
actually framed the human in terms of a metaphor; the metaphor of the information processing 
system, which thus makes it essentially similar to a machine.  
Later developments in cybernetics have shifted the focus of attention from feedback loops to 
the self-organization, or autopoiesis, of living systems. The theory of autopoiesis has had a great 
influence on biomedicine, resulting in the abandonment of the idea of exerting external control on 
the body in the form of prostheses and the like, that were characteristic of medicine in the post 
World War II era. This change in perspective has resulted in an increased concentration on system 
inherent influence and control procedures and is also related to the growing successes of molecular 
biology.88  
Because cybernetics was basically concerned with the formal description of the behaviour of 
systems in terms of information communication, it proved to be very successful in serving as a 
language, bridging gaps between different sciences.89 Information got conceptualized as an entity 
unbound by material substrates; as something that is in fact more fundamental than any kind of 
materiality. Information came to be viewed as the essential form underlying all phenomena. In the 
context of medicine this means that even the body itself loses its materiality to some extent, and 
becomes a carrier of extractable information.90 
The cybernetic expansion of man as well as the concept of information have exerted a huge 
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influence on visions of technologically enhancing humans that are faithfully depicted in familiar 
science fiction scenarios. 
 
The Ciba Symposium 
 
Despite the fact that following the Second World War the potentially sinister applications of 
eugenics and modern technology came to light many remained optimistic about the prospects of 
future development. At a famous symposium organized by the Ciba Foundation – now “Novartis 
Foundation – in 1963 Huxley, Haldane and a host of renowned scientists such as Francis Crick, a 
discoverer of DNA structure and Gregory Pincus the father of the Pill pondered over the issues 
raised by the growing possibilities of interference with ‘natural processes’. Out of concern for the 
quality of the human gene pool a number of participants articulated the desirability of eugenic 
interventions.91  
 In a summary of the symposium’s topics Julian Huxley speaks of the rise of a new 
philosophy that is informed by natural sciences and takes the transformation of the human species 
as its target. He christians this emerging philosophy “evolutionary humanism” implying that the old 
idea of man’s self-driven transformation, emphatically voiced by Mirandola, is now combined with 
an evolutionary view. 92 Even in the 1960s Huxley echoed the old concern that humanity’s genetic 
constitution is on the decline, so that  
Eugenics will eventually have to have recourse to methods like multiple insemination by 
preferred donors of high genetic quality […] Such a policy will not be easy to execute. 
However, I confidently look forward to a time when eugenic improvement will become one of 
the major aims of mankind.93 
In fact, he considered the development of a global evolutionary policy to be of prime importance, so 
that all other policy domains would have to be derivative of it. 
It was a time when fears about genetic degeneration due to radiation were widespread and certainly 
a time when Cold War paranoia was almost palpable. Expressing this quite frankly Lederberg a 
professor of genetics at Stanford noted: 
I think that most of us here believe that the present population of the world is not intelligent 
enough to keep itself from being blown up, and we would like to make some provision for the 
future so that it will have a slightly better chance of avoiding this particular contingency.94 
Of course, such technocratic views were not entirely general at the symposium and some more 
sober voices raised the question as to the likelihood of decreasing such dangers by genetic 
interventions. 
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It is rather interesting that the conference took place at about the time when effective 
contraceptive measures were first developed, so the topic of population control was also high on 
the agenda. Crick for example raised the controversial question whether people have the right to 
have children at all.95 He held the view that it is not at all a private manner but something in 
which the state and community at large have a serious vested interest. He even proposed to  
[…] encourage by financial means those people who are more socially desirable to have more 
children […] the way to do this is to tax children. […] it is unreasonable to take money as an 
exact measure of social desirability, but at least they are fairly positively correlated. 
So the desirable man of the future is one with economic resources. He serves as the guarantor of the 
increase in the genetic quality of mankind.  
The scientists of the gathering also recognized that their grandiose plans were probably 
difficult to carry through in an atmosphere of public outrage. So they set out to devise careful plans 
that could communicate and teach the populace about the importance of proper eugenic 
interventions. The volume published a few years after the conference is truly a fascinating read as it 
offers insight to bewildering technocratic visions. It is very much like eavesdropping on a 
discussion between Plato’s man-breeders contemplating the ideal composition of citizens of the 
future. Remarkably, most members who championed eugenic and other interventions spoke in the 
name of humanity and representing a form of humanism. This was probably the last time that 
scientist took it on themselves to design an ideal path of progression, because soon after a new 
approach to human perfectibility and self-transformation emerged in the form of transhumanism. 
 
Transhumanism Enters the Stage 
 
The word ‘transhumanism’ was introduced by Julian Huxley, writing in 1957 that  
The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself – not just sporadically [...] but in 
its entirety, as humanity. We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism 
will serve: man remaining man, but transcending himself, by realizing new 
possibilities of and for his human nature.96 
Whereas British biofuturists thought in terms of hundreds and thousands of years of evolution that 
still awaited mankind before it reached its full potential, second wave transhumanists such as 
Fereidoun M. Esfandiary – or FM-2030 – proclaimed that the transition from human to transhuman 
was already happening and could be further accelerated by actively supporting the advancement of 
science.97 He wrote with unfaltering optimism and hope about a very near future in which humanity 
would be completely transformed. 
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We want to spread a daring new optimism crystallizing from the obvious fact that for the first 
time in all the eons of life we are no longer blackholed within this microplanet – no longer 
trapped within fragile terminal bodies – that we are emerging as a triumphant new species – 
extraterrestrial and immortal.98 
I believe the continuity between such proclamations and those of earlier thinkers, especially the 
Russian Cosmists is striking. FM-2030’s programmatic work contributed greatly to the launch of 
transhumanism as a movement. The book Engines of Creation published by Eric Drexler in 1986 
also became a central work of reference.99 Drexler described a potentially paradisiacal future in 
which the joint application of nanotechnology and advanced artificial intelligence would enable the 
creation of universal assemblers that could manufacture literally anything, thereby banishing the 
problem of scarcity and enabling fantastic forms of human enhancement via integration with our 
nervous system.  
 The central tenet of current day transhumanism is that the present form of humanity is but a 
transitory stage in the evolution of intelligence. With the advent of sophisticated technologies 
evolution by natural selection is being superseded by technological evolution driven by humans. 
There are a number of different views about the projected endpoint of this new evolutionary 
process. Ideas range from the colonization of space, through branching off into a number of 
superintelligent species to the idea that we will merge our consciousness with vast non-biological 
forms of intelligence thus moving beyond physical bodily existence altogether.100 
In 1990 Max More and Tom Bell founded the Extropy Institute which had a strong 
libertarian orientation. The institute became defunct in 2006 after having accomplished its goal of 
raising awareness for transhumanist issues, developing a coherent philosophy and enabling 
networking between futurists. In 1998 Nick Bostrom and David Pearce founded the World 
Transhumanist Association (WTA), an international non-governmental organization promoting the 
ethical use of technology to extend human capabilities. In 2008 the WTA changed its name to 
Humanity Plus.  
In 2008 even the Oxford English Dictionary added the word transhumanism with the 
following definition: “[a] belief that the human race can evolve beyond its current limitations, esp. 
by the use of science and technology.”101 Due to the heterogeneity of the contemporary 
transhumanist movement it would be difficult to find a more precise definition that simultaneously 
did justice to the many streams emphasizing and embracing different aspects of the human-
technology merger.  In recent years Nick Bostrom – head of the Future of Humanity Institute at 
Oxford University – has been a frequent member of commissions and international projects 
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assessing the ethical issues related to human enhancement technologies.  
As a result of a broad range of online and real life activities such as organizing conferences, 
arranging meetings, networking, etc. together with the Institute for Ethics and Emerging 
Technologies – a major transhumanist think tank – transhumanism has gradually transformed itself 
from a rather fringe movement in the 1980s and 1990s to an extremely well organized, well 
represented and omnipresent intellectual position. Especially its proximity to science fiction and 
popular culture has made its spread very rapid, but transhumanist ideas are also represented in 
academia and their perspective has gained entry into a number of top level technology assessment 
and technology foresight documents both in the US and Europe.102  
Transhumanism represents the most current wave in the long tradition of thought that has 
embraced the prospect of technologically transforming mankind for the better. It clearly stands in 
the tradition of meliorism and embraces the Enlightenment idea of liberating man from nature as 
well as the humanist impetus that defines man as an unsettled being who can freely chose its own 
destiny.  
 
The End of Utopia? 
 
It becomes clear from this short historic survey that for the most part the idea of human 
perfectibility had been closely allied to broader concerns about the future of humanity. This is 
especially true of 20th century visionary projects such as Russian Cosmism or Biofuturism. Even the 
scientists at the Ciba conference were worried about the development of our species and saw the 
necessity of a global solution to the challenges we faced. This is especially remarkable since their 
faith in science and collective visions seems to bear almost no trace of the devastations of the 
previous two world wars. In a certain sense the utopianism of perfecting humans, banishing death 
and scarcity and creating a (more) blissful society has survived very long. Yet, by the time we come 
to transhumanist aspirations we see an important shift. Most transhumanists do not think in terms of 
broad political projects that also involve the technological transformation of man but rather consider 
enhancement as a personal issue. So despite the fact that by now even the popular press is full of 
fantastic images of a bright future that a few centuries ago were only entertained by a select few 
intellectuals, the truly transformative power of utopias as sources of contemplating political 
alternatives has faded.  
 […] the abandonment of the larger social project connects […] personal utopianism with 
political cynicism, because it is no longer thought necessary to guarantee to the collective that 
which is pursued by the individual. Mass utopia, once considered the logical correlate of 
personal utopia, is now a rusty idea. It is being discarded by industrial societies along with the 
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earliest factories designed to deliver it.103 
Instead, the prospect of technological self-perfection aligns with philosophies of individualism and 
capitalism as market mechanisms are deemed optimal to deal with enhancements. From the grand 
vision of abolishing the ultimate injustice of temporal limitations that heated Russian Cosmists we 
have come to a mere affirmation of the fact that we just do not want life to end because we do not 
want to miss out on any opportunities. Similarly, the frightening totalizing grandeur of “cultivating 
humanity to a higher form” has muted into the equally problematic idea that “Our bodies will be the 
next fashion statement; we will design them in all sorts of interesting combinations of texture, 
colours, tones, and luminosity.”104 
 The reasons for this change are certainly complex and I will come to discuss one possible 
interpretation in the third chapter of this thesis. 
 
Summary 
 
We have thus briefly traced the vision of human perfectibility from ancient times to our present day. 
Hopefully, this chapter has demonstrated that the idea is far from new and has in fact accompanied 
the history of Western civilization in different forms. There are characteristic types of 
argumentation and tropes that run through the entire story, such as the commitment to a supposedly 
humanist idea that man’s nature consists in having no fixed nature at all. Man is understood as a 
free being who has, through the course of scientific development learned to gradually rid itself of 
limitations and constraints. I will now turn to the contemporary debate where precisely this issue of 
modifying human nature by technological means is played out between proponents and opponents 
of enhancement technologies. 
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 - Chapter 2 -  
 
Enhancement and Posthumanity 
 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
Now that the historical reconstruction of the idea of human perfectibility is complete I turn to a 
discussion of the contemporary debate about our attempts at modifying human nature. The brief 
historical survey has shown that the belief in man’s nature being ultimately freely formable had 
been present since Humanism. Debates in the present ignite precisely about this issue, whether can 
or should transform ourselves without constraints.  
As I already mentioned in the Introduction current philosophical positions on human 
enhancement can be broadly divided into two categories. On the one hand so called bio-
conservative authors such as Jürgen Habermas, Francis Fukuyama or Leon Kass argue for the strict 
control or even ban of enhancements. Their arguments are met by techno-progressive thinkers like 
Julian Savulescu, Nick Bostrom or Gregory Stock. Of course, this is a rather coarse categorization 
but it serves well to illustrate the highly polarized nature of the debate. It is an interesting feature 
that thinkers who find themselves in the company of each other as representing similar views may 
otherwise show very little intellectual kinship. This is especially true of the bioconservative 
position, where the Frankfurt School giant Jürgen Habermas may have little in common with the 
neoconservative Fukuyama.  
In this chapter I am going to first sketch very briefly the scientific breakthroughs in 
molecular biology without which there would be no debate today. Then I discuss a number of 
authors, namely Habermas, Fukuyama, Stock and Bostrom because their views represent some of 
the most often referenced standard positions in the debate. 
My aim in this chapter is on the one hand to demonstrate how bioconservative positions 
revert to a form of essentialism in conceptualising human nature. On the other hand, I intend to 
show that technopogressive arguments are caught in a paradoxical fantasy of liberation and 
emancipation. I claim that the problems of these positions result in both cases from a separation of 
the object from the subject that is characteristic of philosophical modernity and which treats the 
essence of man separable from nature and technological interventions. Whereas bioconservatives 
believe that technologies impinge upon a separate human essence or nature, progressives hold that 
by submitting nature to technological control we can attain freedom of the subject. Instead of these 
positions I argue with Hayles and Haraway for a more ambiguous relationship between man and 
technology and a different notion of posthumanism that takes the inseparability and mutually 
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constitutive nature of man and technology as a starting point.  
 
How We Learned to Engineer Ourselves 
 
The first major scientific breakthrough that serves as the precondition of the entire debate about 
genetic enhancements was the identification of the DNA molecule’s physical structure by James D. 
Watson and Francis Crick in 1953. By unravelling how the four nucleotide bases adenine, cytosine, 
guanine and thymine were paired to form the double-helix structure they dissolved one great 
mystery of genetics and transformed it into straightforward chemistry.105  
The second major breakthrough came with Fred Sanger in the mid 1970s who found a 
method of reading long strands of DNA in an accessible manner. He used different chemicals that 
selectively attached to only one of the four bases thereby providing the gene sequence.  Thus, 
within twenty years of the discovery of the structure of DNA science advanced to having 
recombinant DNA methodologies that allowed for the splicing and pasting of DNA sequences of 
different origin, enabling the creation of hybrid organisms. This was the birth of genetic 
technologies and 1976 marks the foundation of the first such company Genentech Inc., which 
brought to market the first medicinal product created via recombinant DNA methodologies, namely 
synthetic human insulin.106 
 As Rheinberger and Müller-Wille note recombinant DNA methodologies and the 
implementation of molecular processes in machines have effectively engendered a new paradigm as 
the basis of molecular biology. It was no longer the case that scientists needed to create optimal in 
vitro conditions in order to study organisms but rather that the cellular milieu itself had become a 
site of experimentation. The goal was no longer the extracellular representation of intracellular 
processes, but the exploitation of biological mechanisms to realize extracellular projects.107 It marks 
the birth of synthetic biology – something that has become a catch-phrase recently – where it 
becomes possible to utilize cellular processes for the creation of novel biological entities. It also 
marks the convergence of biological science with engineering, representing in effect the „rewriting” 
of life. This paradigm shift was the precondition of contemporary talk of biology becoming more 
„open” to intervention. David Jackson brought the possibilities of genetic engineering to a succinct 
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point in a lecture under the revealing title DNA: Template for an Economic Revolution: 
I would argue that the ability to read, write and edit DNA is functionally unprecedented in 
human history. All we have ever been able to do before is to select among the various 
combinations of genes that the mechanisms of genetics have presented to us. And, while we 
have developed very powerful and sophisticated selection procedures, selecting from among a 
set of alternatives over which one has almost no control is fundamentally different from being 
able to write and edit one’s own text. […] the ability to write and edit DNA is the basis for a 
synthetic and a creative capability in biology that has not previously existed.108 
This type of language has established the metaphor of the DNA as a kind of text that we are now 
learning to read and may soon be able to edit also in the case of humans. The genome became the 
equivalent of a code that we are increasingly in a position to crack. 
Debates about safety issues related to genetic engineering sprung up quickly and following 
serious initial concerns and doubts seemed to have come under control by the 1980s as actors 
recognized that under careful control and adequate safety measures the possible gains far 
outweighed supposed and feared risks.109 However, the debate is far from settled as constant 
controversies over the use of genetically modified organisms show. 
These developments concerned mainly agricultural and medicinal products. The next great 
source of disagreement was the arrival of “test tube babies”, in-vitro fertilization. This has inflamed 
debates about the manufacturing of humans in laboratories and ignited some, such as Leon Kass to 
call it a war against human nature that ultimately leads to “the divorce of the generation of new 
human life from human sexuality and ultimately from the confines of the human body”110 Kass has 
later changed his mind and considers IVF appropriate as a treatment. However, IVF in effect is the 
precondition of enhancement oriented reproductive technologies and serves as a threshold or 
Rubicon that had already been crossed. IVF involves the creation and discarding of human embryos 
so any consistent position arguing against genetic enhancements would have to be also against IVF. 
In any case, it turned out that Louise Brown, the first test-tube baby born in 1978 was also just a 
normal human whose existence did not assault humanity and explode values. By now IVF has 
mostly been firmly established as a form of infertility treatment what makes the case of people like 
Kass quite difficult but the debate about the ethicality of the procedure still continues.111 
Moving on in the history of reproductive technologies we come to the birth of Dolly the 
sheep in 1996 that is: cloning. Put very simply the procedure of cloning by Somatic Nuclear Cell 
Transfer involves taking an adult cell, transferring its nucleus into an egg cell and then chemically 
“convincing” it to become a fertilized zygote that can then be implanted into the “mother.” By this 
                                                 
108
 Jackson, D., A., DNA: Template for an Economic Revolution, in Chambers, D., A., (ed.) The Double Helix: 
Perspective and Prospective at Forty Years, New York 1995, P. 364. 
109
 Gottweis, H., Genetic Engineering, Discourses of Deficiency, and the New Politics of Population, in Taylor, P., 
Halfon, S., Edwards, P., (eds.) Changing Life, University of Minnesota Press, 1997, Minneapolis p. 70. 
110
 Leon Kass quoted in Marantz Henig, P., Pandora’s Baby Houghton Mifflin, New York 2004. p. 70. 
111
 See for example Warnock, M., Making Babies: Is there a right to have children?, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 37 
procedure it is possible to create belated genetically identical twins.112 The fact that the first cloned 
being was a sheep was like adding oil to fire and engendered similar reactions as IVF did two 
decades earlier. It seemed like biotechnology by making copies of living beings had made the mass 
manufacture of humans possible. A huge debate erupted over the permissibility of human cloning, 
which was rejected by most scientists. Nevertheless, some hoax figures have claimed to have 
successfully cloned humans.113 The nature of the debate changed as scientists discovered human 
embryonic stem cells that had the capability of developing into any kind of somatic cell. The new 
concepts of therapeutic cloning, as opposed to reproductive cloning emerged.  
Whereas the universally rejected reproductive cloning would mean the creation of an 
embryo with the intention of carrying it to term, therapeutic cloning involves the creation of cloned 
embryos for the purpose of extracting stem cells and developing these into whatever is needed by 
the patient, such as liver cells, nerve cells, skin cells, etc. This prospect is the catalyst of the vision 
of regenerative medicine and prospect of radically prolonged lives.114  
In the words of Gregory Stock, reproductive human cloning – the creation of belated genetic 
twins – is an uninteresting technology that bears neither therapeutic nor enhancement promises and 
would be profoundly dangerous and immoral to try due to the dangers involved.115 Dolly was the 
result of hundreds of failed attempts and developed many diseases before her early death so a 
similar procedure is ruled out in the case of humans. As regards therapeutic cloning, the debate 
rages on about the moral status of the embryo and the legitimacy of creating life for the purpose of 
exploiting it.116 Unfortunately, the discussion of this debate is not possible within the scope of this 
thesis. 
Finally, a huge step in the development of bioscience was the start of the Human Genome 
Project, which aimed at decoding the sequence of human DNA. It started in 1990 and was an 
international joint venture that later developed into a competition between the publicly funded HGP 
and the private initiative of Celera Inc. In order to avoid patenting parts of the human genome 
massive amounts of data were published daily in the open access database GenBank.117 The 
Humane Genome Project was a research undertaking of truly epic proportions and was driven by 
the equally grand aspiration to unlock the genetic code of human life. The project was fuelled by the 
expectation to uncover the „Holy Grail” of genetics and „promised to reveal the genetic blueprint 
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that tells us who we are.”118 Thanks to exponential increases in computing power the project 
finished ahead of schedule. The announcement of the first draft of the human genome at the White 
House in 2000 was a grandiose event where President Bill Clinton used truly elevated words to 
describe this landmark achievement. 
Today's announcement represents more than just an epic-making triumph of science and 
reason. After all, when Galileo discovered he could use the tools of mathematics and 
mechanics to understand the motion of celestial bodies, he felt, in the words of one eminent 
researcher, "that he had learned the language in which God created the universe." 
Today, we are learning the language in which God created life. We are gaining ever more awe 
for the complexity, the beauty, the wonder of God's most divine and sacred gift. With this 
profound new knowledge, humankind is on the verge of gaining immense, new power to heal. 
Genome science will have a real impact on all our lives -- and even more, on the lives of our 
children. It will revolutionize the diagnosis, prevention and treatment of most, if not all, 
human diseases.119 
This insight has provoked significant anxieties and the prospect of learning and eventually 
manipulating this „code of codes” provided impetus for broad and multi-faceted philosophical and 
ethical discussions. 
 
The Human Zoo 
 
Turning more closely to enhancement uses of medical technology and the transformation of 
humans, a great controversy emerged following Peter Sloterdijk’s polemical lecture held in 1999 
under the title “Rules for the Human Zoo”, which was meant to be a reply to Heidegger’s Letter on 
‘Humanism’. In this lecture Sloterdijk interpreted humanism as a form of literary society held 
together by long letters written by its members to each other. In his view humanism was nothing 
less than mankind’s attempt at taming itself and preventing a slide into barbarism. Yet, he views this 
attempt as having failed once and for all. Hence, he poses the question: “What can tame man, when 
the role of humanism as the school for humanity has collapsed?”120 How to tame the man of the 
future once the classical literary society has turned out to be ineffective? Sloterdijk considers the 
growing manipulative power of genetic technologies and presents the image of a human zoo that 
would transform all matters hitherto deemed political in nature to questions about the proper 
regulations of „man-breeding”. In the future the gulf between the literate and the illiterate that has 
characterized humanism will give way to the power structure of the breeders and the bred. After a 
tour de force through the writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger, Sloterdijk settles by a discussion of 
Plato’s dialogue The Statesman, which he interprets as a conversation between shepherds about the 
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art of man-breeding.  
Sloteridjk’s text laments over the passing of the era of humanism’s literary society in a 
sometimes melancholic and ambivalent tone, but he also uses very harsh words and concepts that 
have a sinister past. Understandably his use of such words as „breed” and statements like “for the 
next period of time species politics will be decisive”121 or “it will become necessary in the future to 
formulate a codex of anthropotechnology”122 have caused much incomprehension and even an 
outright scandal. Though Sloterdijk probably understood his own text as discussing the arrival of a 
post-literary and post-humanist society following the breakup of classical humanism he had been 
taken as advocating a new program of eugenics. His vague formulations, controversial choice of 
words and the general sensitivity of the subject in Germany have given rise to a long lasting 
philosophical scandal that incited some of the greatest thinkers to voice their opinion.  
Now I am going to turn to Jürgen Habermas’ major intervention in the debate, which was 
partly motivated by his furore about the Sloterdijk lecture and developments around the Human 
Genome Project he considered troubling. 
 
Habermas and the Ethical Self-Understanding of our Species 
 
Already at the time when genetic engineering was still a thing of the future Robert Nozick made 
some prescient remarks in his book Anarchy, State and Utopia. 
Consider […] the issue of genetic engineering. Many biologists tend to think the problem is 
one of design, of specifying the best types of persons so that biologists can proceed to 
produce them. Thus they worry over what sort(s) of person there is to be and who will control 
this process. They do not tend to think, perhaps because it diminishes the importance of their 
role, of a system in which they run a "genetic supermarket," meeting the individual 
specifications (within certain moral limits) of prospective parents […] This supermarket 
system has the great virtue that it involves no centralized decision fixing the future of human 
type(s).123 
The notion of a genetic supermarket and the specific content of “certain moral limits” have been 
intensely debated ever since. The fear of the resurgence of eugenics in a system driven by market 
forces and consumer demand has been omnipresent and in 1991 Abby Lippman coined the term 
”geneticization”, which she defined as a “process by which differences between individuals are 
reduced to their DNA codes.”124 The dystopian prospect of a world along these lines was forcefully 
depicted in the 1997 movie GATTACA.125 
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Without explicitly acknowledging it Habermas has also picked up on this line of concerns in 
2001 when he published his book The Future of Human Nature but he has developed a unique 
argument. Habermas deals mainly with such practices as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, which 
is a method employed in IVF in order to screen for eventual genetic diseases. The procedure allows 
for the prospective parents to select only those embryos for implantation that are free of the genes 
associated with specific diseases that might run in the family. Besides this method Habermas also 
considers technologies that are not presently available such as the direct manipulation of human 
embryos with the aim of changing their genetic constitution. He believes it is necessary to ponder 
possibilities that are perhaps distant or may never materialize for it is much better to contemplate 
the impossible than to be caught by surprise. 
He uses quite strong words to condemn certain practices, such as the “perversely-delayed 
use of frozen egg cells”126 and his overall tone suggests deep concern over the subject. Habermas is 
worried that the immense financial gains that are associated with biotechnological progress might 
overrun public ethical debates and considerations. He is mostly disturbed by the possibility that 
self-instrumentalizing practices such as PID, genetic engineering or stem cell technologies might 
make us “swap [our] sensitivity regarding the normative and natural foundations of [our] existence 
for the narcissistic indulgence of our own preferences.”127 By this he means that we might come to 
live in a society where market mechanisms are employed to select or create coming generations, so 
that the decision about an individual’s existence will come to be predicated upon the possession of 
certain biological traits. Habermas likens this system to an initial quality control that serves as the 
precondition of entering life altogether and he attempts to provide an argument against such use 
before we slide into an era of liberal eugenics. These tendencies would exacerbate the “colonization 
of the lifeworld” by the calculating rationality of instrumental technology. His aim is to ensure that 
we stick to a “logic of healing” and use technologies where they are appropriate but avoid self-
instrumentalization altogether.128 The attempted solution is quite complex but as I intend to show it 
fails to accomplish what it sets out to achieve.  
First of all, Habermas believes that we cross a crucial line once we start to apply the method 
of manipulation and control not only to “outer” nature but also to our “inner” nature too. This step 
warrants critical concern. However, he rejects the simple approach of van Daele to moralize human 
nature by artificially erecting a boundary and saying: hither but no further! Habermas recognizes 
that this kind of arbitrary resacralization or sanctification of that what science and technology have 
made accessible, malleable and disenchanted is not the correct path to pursue or one that can be 
philosophically maintained. Habermas intends to speak of the moralizing of human nature in a 
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rather different sense. As he says:  
A quite different scenario, however, emerges if "moralizing human nature" is seen as the 
assertion of an ethical self-understanding of the species which is crucial for our capacity to 
see ourselves as the authors of our own life histories, and to recognize one another as 
autonomous persons. 129 
These lines contain all the key concepts and in fact the essence of the entire book. Habermas 
attempts to moralize human nature by showing that self-instrumentalizing practices are an assault to 
the ethical self-understanding of our species and would undermine the possibility of autonomy. 
Furthermore, he intends to show this in a manner that is true to our post-metaphysical era, that is, 
without recourse to any particular faith or concept of the Good for he recognizes that modern 
pluralistic societies must generate moral cohesion and forms of legitimation from within their own 
resources. For Habermas this represents the “increasing reflexivity of a modernity that realizes its 
own limits”130 and he locates these necessary resources in webs of interpersonal relations of mutual 
respect. To be sure, this is perhaps the greatest challenge, since bioethical debates are perplexing as 
they are precisely because they make judgments about the value of life and certain practices and 
institutions unavoidable. Finding a mutually acceptable, rational common ground in this terrain that 
is not committed to any particular view of life and the Good is therefore extraordinarily difficult. 
For the noted bioethicist Engelhardt consensus is not likely to emerge from bioethical debates 
because  
[…] parties are separated by incompatible metaphysical commitments (e.g., embryos 
do or do not have an immortal soul), religious moral beliefs (e.g., euthanasia does or 
does not involve the sin of murder), and by divergent rankings of cardinal moral 
concerns (e.g., the claims of security do or do not trump concerns for prosperity).131  
In either case, Habermas attempts to articulate such a theory in order to ensure the “right to a 
genetic inheritance immune from artificial intervention”132 The first difficulties arise here, because 
artificiality is not clearly defined, but Habermas most probably means interventions via genetic 
technologies such as germline genetic engineering. This would mean however, that a germline 
intervention to enhance is rejectable and should be banned on the grounds of being artificial, 
whereas any other practice regardless of its effect on the foetus, such as alcohol consumption – to 
use an exaggerated example -, which is known to severely impact foetal development does not 
count as an artificial intervention and can thus be morally condemned at most, but is no assault on 
the ethical self-understanding of the species. 
 Habermas considers instrumentalizing technological manipulations to be assaults on human 
dignity. However, in his view dignity is not a characteristic that one can possess or lose but rather it 
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is connected to a sense of relational symmetry that exists in communicative situations.  
Habermas also draws on Hannah Arendt’s concept of natality, which Arendt understood as 
the abysmal foundation of man’s ability to act in the world. As she wrote: “Because they are 
initium, newcomers and beginners by virtue of birth, men take initiative, are prompted into 
action.”133 This served to express the idea that free acts of persons could not be traced back to any 
reason or ground other than themselves, their being born. The natality of every man by virtue of 
bringing something new into the world also stands for that individual’s capability to initiate novelty.  
Habermas in turn argues that the unmanipulated, chance birth of each and every individual 
regardless of class, race, gender, etc., guarantees that they will be free and autonomous authors of 
their own life history. Even though environment, education, upbringing and a range of other factors 
might play a role and exert considerable influence it is still possible to take a communicate stance 
towards these. For Habermas this holds true even for the earliest influences of upbringing, which he 
sees as involving reasons and grounds on the side of the parents, which can retrospectively be 
grasped or worked upon and its effects eventually transformed. As opposed to this kind of 
relationship genetic interventions would change the very substrate of life and the preconditions of 
all future communicative relationships in a way that excludes the affected individual. Thus, it would 
be impossible to take a communicative stance to an altered genetic constitution because it is by 
definition not a dialogical but a one-way process. Habermas supposes that it is possible to employ 
genetic technologies to completely determine future individuals’ traits and uses the term 
“programming” to describe this. 
Eugenic programming of desirable traits and dispositions, however, gives rise to moral 
misgivings as soon as it commits the person concerned to a specific life-project or, in any case 
puts specific restriction on his freedom to choose a life of his own.134 
This line of argumentation seems rather convincing at first sight and the implied comparison of the 
grown and the made, between programmed and free individuals seems plausible. However, there 
are a number of problems with Habermas’ proposal. 
First of all, while he attempts to distinguish therapy from enhancement he offers no clear-cut 
criteria to do so. It seems quite problematic that Habermas does not reflect at all on the process of 
medicalization and the social construction of disease itself. How is it that certain conditions come to 
be seen as diseases and which of these warrant a genetic intervention? If Habermas is worried about 
sliding into a society that trades moral concerns for the “narcissistic indulgence of our own 
preferences” then it would seem necessary to reflect on the processes as a result of which any 
condition turns out to be pathological. As the range of phenomena over which medicine has the 
final word gradually expands there is growing concern that aspects of everyday life are gradually 
                                                 
133
 Arendt, H., The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, 1958. p. 177 
134
 Ibid. P. 61 
 43 
turned into pathologies, “narrowing the range of what is considered acceptable.”135 This trend is 
definitely on the rise and it increasingly includes such “personality traits” as sadness, shyness, 
etc.136 Adding to the trend of medicalization is the general orientation towards a search for genetic 
causes, which  makes Habermas’ attempt to consider therapeutic interventions unproblematic highly 
questionable. 
It further seems justified to say that Habermas entertains two somewhat conflicting notions 
at the same time. On the one hand he allows for the possibility of interventions aimed at treatment, 
because these – at least supposedly – take the dialogical principle of counting with the possible 
consent of the other seriously. On the other hand, enhancing interventions are rejected outright 
because they irrevocably undermine individual autonomy. So there seems to be a very strange 
biologism at work here that treats the untouched – or at most restored to “health” – state of the 
genome as the precondition of autonomy. But this move, equating an unenhanced genome with the 
precondition of autonomy seems to be a highpoint of biologism for it degrades humans to 
completely determined creatures. 
Finally, the argumentation and the claims Habermas puts forth get weaker and weaker as we 
progress. As we have seen, it ultimately takes the form of a conditional sentence: “gives rise to 
moral misgivings as soon as it commits the person concerned to a specific life-project”137 But it is 
far from clear when and if this kind of limitation is true of such interventions. What started out as an 
assault on human dignity, the radical transformation of the ethical self-understanding of our species 
and similarly bloated claims mutates towards to end of the book to a mere supposition. Habermas 
recognizes namely, that genetic technologies are not problematic per se, but rather certain 
applications of them are. What applications? Applications aimed at improvement. Why? For the 
supposed reason that  
Eugenic interventions aiming at enhancement reduce ethical freedom insofar as they tie down 
the person concerned to rejected, but irreversible intentions of third parties, barring him form 
the spontaneous self-perception of being the undivided author of his own life. Abilities and 
skills may be easier to identify with than dispositions, let alone properties, but the only thing 
that counts for the psychical resonance of the person concerned is the intention associated 
with the programming enterprise. Only in the negative case of the prevention of extreme and 
highly generalized evils may we have good reasons to assume that the person concerned 
would consent to the eugenic goal.138 
It is rather remarkable that Habermas positions himself as an expert on the “psychical resonance” of 
persons and claims that no one would ever retrospectively consent to anything other than measures 
taken to avoid some “extreme and highly generalized evil”, whatever that could be. If we supposed 
                                                 
135
 Conrad, P., The Medicalization of Society, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.  p 7. 
136
 See for example Horwitz, A. W., Wakefield, J. C., The Loss of Sadness - How Psychiatry Transformed Normal 
Sorrow into Depressive Disorder, Oxford University Press, New York 2007. 
137
 Habermas op. cit. p. 61 (The italics are mine.) 
138
 Ibid. P. 63. 
 44 
for a moment that the urban legend were true that listening to Mozart during pregnancy increased 
the intelligence of the child would Habermas condemn the parent for her intention to enhance? 
Unfortunately, we do not get any examples from Habermas for an intervention that would limit and 
block the child’s open future. Would enhanced intelligence, musical talent, mathematical skill, 
sports ability bar the child from an open future? It rather seems that enhancing a number of traits 
opens possibilities instead of blocking them.139 So Habermas’s fear about blocking the child’s open 
future if the intervention locks him on a certain path – although I am not sure what kind of 
intervention could do that – seems more directed at what Michael Sandel has called 
“hyperparenting” namely the parental intention to create children who fulfil certain goals set by the 
parent, such as a career in music, sports, or whatever.140 Yet, the existence of hyperparenting 
practices is not in itself an argument against the technology of genetic enhancement, because the 
child’s’ curbed autonomy is not the result of a technological intervention but rather the complex 
interaction between parental expectations, child-rearing practices and also the technological 
possibility. 
 Furthermore, his notion that a chance birth enables us to become the ‘undivided autonomous 
authors of our life history’ draws on an understanding of autonomy that seems unwarranted. Even 
though a distinction between genetic and other forms of exerting influence, such as upbringing can 
seem justified, still, the claim seems overstated that the former undermines the possibility of 
individual autonomy whereas the latter leaves it untouched.  
 The use of the term “ethical self-understanding of the human species” also seems 
problematic, especially if we consider that Habermas repeatedly stressed the fact that bioethics is 
characterised by conflicting views that are informed by divergent cultural, philosophical and other 
convictions. Yet, he constantly speaks of “us” as sharing his version of the ethical self-
understanding of our species. He justifies this move with recourse to the fact that major religions 
converge on this issue of a “minimal ethical self-understanding of the species”.141 However, this is 
quite troublesome once we recognize that in fact religions greatly diverge on this issue. So for 
example the Judaic tradition considers any technology that humans can develop as “an uncovering 
of another method built into creation by G-d for mankind to use in positive ways.”142 In Rabbi 
Barry Freundel’s view the challenge lies in using these technologies wisely, but he explicitly favors 
life extending interventions, since „Every hour added to someone's life comes with the possibility of 
doing good deeds and repentance and is, therefore, more valuable in this way than all of life in the 
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world to come.”143 As we can see, this line of reasoning dissolves the grounds of speaking of 
artificial interventions at all and leaves only wise and unwise uses. Furthermore, as the prevention 
of suffering counts as a chief moral concern in Judaism the prevention of the birth of children with 
genetic diseases can be seen as a moral duty that certainly does not lie outside the realm of the 
“natural”.144 
 It is also worth considering how Habermas uses the term “insturmentalizing” or “self-
instrumentalizing.” It is greatly reminiscent of the Kantian distinction between persons and things. 
Whereas persons belong to the realm of moral subjects who are autonomous, things are determined 
and manipulable. The problem with current biotechnologies is that they increasingly make our 
biological life contingent on choices. So Habermas might fear that as a result we may cease to be 
persons, lose our autonomy and become degraded to the level of things. This seems somewhat 
problematic even if we take Habermas’ inspiration, Kant as our guide. As Paul Rabinow points out, 
in the formulation of his ethical imperatives Kant was much less categorical and exclusive as 
Habermas. Kant wrote: “So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any 
other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only.”145 As Rabinow remarks, adding the 
word „only” opens a „crucial space of reflection and action.“146 The lack of this crucial space of 
reflection and action is evidenced by Habermas’ own struggles with and ultimate failure in 
delineating therapy from enhancement, because each form of treatment always and necessarily 
treats the person also as a means in that it employs the instrumentalizing attitude of science. In a 
later section I am going to argue that we should probably do away with this kind of 
conceptualization altogether that tries to keep human subjectivity, autonomy and freedom separate 
and distinct from technological impingement. Ironically, it is Hannah Arendt – among others – who 
brought our intertwined relationship with the myriad things of the world pointedly to expression by 
saying “Whatever touches or enters into a sustained relationship with human life immediately 
assumes the character of a condition of human existence.”147 
All in all, Habermas’ argument relies on a very strong concept of autonomy and a form of 
biologism and genetic determinism that had been discredited by the very Human Genome Project 
that partly motivated him to pen his thoughts on the subject. Habermas writes on the reductionist 
assumption that it is or will be possible to establish a clear correlation between almost all traits a 
human being can possess and the genome itself and even locates the source of our ethical self-
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understanding in a – more or less unmanipulated – biology. That is, he seems to suppose a straight 
line leading from genotype to phenotype. I will critically engage with this assumption and describe 
the paradigm shift that has taken place since the Human Genome Project’s completion in Chapter 3.  
In the next section I turn to Francis Fukuyama who has also played an important role in the 
development of the debate also as a member of the U.S. President’s Council on Bioethics from 
2001-2005. 
 
Fukuyama and the Slide into Posthumanity 
 
Francis Fukuyama first made a name for himself by arguing with Hegel that the global spread of 
liberal democracy and the fall of Communism represent the end of history. No real contestants of 
the political system of liberal democracy are in sight and the progression of science can be seen as 
one of the key drivers of this process, thus the historical process of political advancement is 
concluded.148 Certainly, this is not the place to discuss his thesis, which he himself has later come to 
revoke. More interesting are his reasons for abandoning it. Besides the events of 9/11 the main 
reason for his change of mind was that in his view biotechnological advances posed significant 
challenges to the way we think about politics. In a series of articles and books since 1999 Fukuyama 
has become one of the key critiques of biotechnologies and an outspoken opponent of streams of 
thought like transhumanism. In a short article in 2004 he even proclaimed transhumanism to be the 
“world’s most dangerous idea”149. In the following sections I am going to discuss his line of 
argumentation because it has greatly influenced the debate. 
 Already in the introduction to the aforementioned article Fukuyama presents 
transhumanism, in a rather cynical tone, as a “strange liberation movement” united under the banner 
of transcending human biological constraints, which we might just as well reject out of hand for its 
inherent absurdity. However, as he goes on, the situation is not so straightforward if we consider 
that current biomedical research often formulates similar goals. He lists the examples of prenatal 
genetic diagnosis, mood altering psychopharmacological substances and gene therapy. Certainly, 
only a handful of people would want to restrict the medical and therapeutic use of such technologies 
and once we consider how laborious, painful and limited human life can be we might even come to 
view transhumanism as an attractive and rational approach. The danger of tranhumanism according 
to Fukuyama is precisely that by receiving it in minor doses, step by step we might slide over and 
not notice its imminent threats and the grave moral price we would have to pay. 
 In his view the first victim of transhumanism would be political equality, which rests upon 
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the belief that there is a common human essence in virtue of which all humans are endowed with an 
inherent value and are inviolable beings. In light of this common human essence all eventual 
differences of race, gender, intelligence, looks, abilities, etc. are dwarfed. The bloody and bitter 
battles for political rights throughout history have gradually established that this inviolability is 
acknowledged simply due to our common, shared humanity. The threat of transhumanism lies 
precisely in its goal of upsetting this foundation of political liberalism by changing the human 
essence. 
 He asks: What sorts of rights would enhanced beings demand for themselves? What 
consequences would such developments have for the poorest countries, which would irrevocably be 
left out of the business of enhancement thereby deepening the already huge divide? If some can 
perfect themselves can anyone allow to be left behind? 
 He further criticizes transhumanists for their supposed belief that it is possible to simply rid 
ourselves of unwanted characteristics and traits while perfecting the rest. Fukuyama draws attention 
to the interrelationship between our “good” and “bad” traits and towards the end of his article he 
warns of the perils of a dehumanized transhumanist future. I believe Fukuyama’s argumentation 
consists of three basic points:150  
1: there is something we can call “human essence” 
2: only those beings or individuals who possess this essence are endowed with inherent 
value and inviolability 
3: transhumanist aspirations would demolish or alter this essence 
His conclusion that we must do everything in our power to prevent such ideas from becoming 
reality because they would undermine political equality flows naturally from his premises. I will 
now consider how consistent this type of argumentation is, looking first briefly at his second and 
third premises and finally at the first one in a more detailed manner. 
 His assumption seems unfounded that only those endowed with the mysterious human 
essence can bear political rights and possess inherent value, whatever this value may mean. This 
becomes clear once we ask the question whether any human being who had been subjected to 
biotechnological manipulations of the like Fukuyama fears would lose his/her political rights and be 
stripped of moral status; or conversely, whether we would revoke the political rights of unenhanced 
human beings should radical enhancement become the norm. Finally, if we were to encounter an 
alien being who showed all signs of being capable of moral judgement, sentience, etc., would we 
not treat it as a moral agent simply in virtue of the fact that it lacked the ‘human essence’? I believe 
the answer is ‘no’ in all cases which suggests that human essence is not a necessary precondition of 
                                                 
150 In the reconstruction of Fukuyama’s argumentation I rely on Nick Bostrom: Transhumanism: The World’s Most 
Dangerous Idea? http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/dangerous.html Last retrieved 20 August 2010 
 48 
moral status and that changes to it would not undermine moral status either. In fact by theoretically 
distributing and revoking political rights on the grounds that some may have a different “essence” 
Fukuyama effectively continues the very line of thought from which he intended to save us all. The 
central tenet of liberal democracies maintaining that all are equal does not refer to a literal equality 
in the sense of similarity in capacities and traits but rather an equality of rights and obligations. As a 
result we have no reason to suppose that any technological manipulation could undermine the 
concept or change the distribution of political rights. Supposing the opposite would mean that we 
considered certain – biological – traits as indispensable for joining the community of equal 
individuals. Consequently, it can be stated that transhumanist aspirations to prolong life and 
enhance cognitive and other capacities would not upset political rights even if they changed the 
mysterious human essence. 
 Let us now consider the first premise concerning the existence of a “human essence”. 
Fukuyama’s article does not give us clear orientation about this notion but his book Our Posthuman 
Future does, even though it refrains form the use of the word “essence” but rather reverts to “human 
nature”, which is used in a similar sense. Quoting Huxley’s Brave New World Fukuyama writes: 
The aim of this book is to argue that Huxley was right, that the most significant threat posed 
by contemporary biotechnology is the possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby 
move us into a “posthuman” stage in history151 
We may thus draw the conclusion that “human nature” and “human essence” are interchangeable 
concepts that have the following features: “Human nature is the sum of the behaviour and 
characteristics that are typical of the human species, arising from genetic rather than environmental 
factors.”152 Fukuyama acknowledges that this definition and especially the word “typical” may need 
further exposition so he adds: “[…] typicality is a statistical artefact – it refers to something close to 
the median of a distribution of behaviour or characteristics.”153 
 Human nature is thus none other than the statistical mean of a set of traits, behaviours and 
characteristics defined by the genetic constitution of humans. There is no doubt that behavioural, 
and evolutionary biology are capable of providing such a human behavioural complex but is this 
enough to serve the purpose Fukuyama intends for it? It turns out that human nature/essence is not 
something mysterious but the result of a series of chance evolutionary mechanisms that has become 
open to intervention by the 21st century. What is more, it has always been in constant interaction 
with our companion species as well as with a host of other factors ranging from bacteria to the 
innumerably rich achievements we call human culture.154 Fukuyama also seems to fall into a kind of 
biological essentialism when he supposes that this set of traits is somehow normative and 
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constitutive of political equality. His attempt at “rescuing” the concept of equality through recourse 
to a human essence ultimately ends in biologism.155 
Fukuyama himself recognizes that his point does not rest on entirely solid grounds so he 
goes on to add that the ultimate basis of equality and moral worth is an indefinable “Factor X”. This 
is what remains when individuals are stripped of all accidental properties and this Factor X is the 
basis of human dignity. However he tries to clarify his point Fukuyama’s position seems to be an 
incoherent mixture, which is further confused by his introduction of the term Factor X and human 
dignity. As the most decisive Encyclopedia of Bioethics notes human dignity is a notoriously 
problematic and vague term that can be employed to argue for opposing bioethical positions.156 In 
Fukuyama’s definition  
Factor X cannot be reduced to the possession of moral choice, or reason, or language, or 
sociability, or sentience, or emotions, or consciousness or any other quality that has been put 
forth as a ground for human dignity. It is all of these qualities coming together in a human 
whole that make up Factor X.157 
This addition only makes his position more incoherent for a number of reasons. First of all, it is still 
by far not clear why an enhanced human being could not possess any or all of the above traits in a 
(post)human whole or why such a being would not recognize the unenhanced as a moral agent with 
equal rights. Furthermore, the previously more or less concrete set of genetically defined traits that 
Fukuyama identified as “human nature/essence” has now miraculously muted into a mixed list 
under the mysterious heading “Factor X“. It seems Fukuyama’s intention is precisely to uphold the 
mystery, when he says “What this whole is and how it came to be remains, in Searle’s word, 
“mysterious”.”158 Fukuyama argues for a qualitative leap, which is by definition unexplainable that 
occurred in the process of evolution from prehuman ancestors to human beings. This leap also takes 
place in the development of each human from a cluster of molecules to a person. Fukuyama is thus 
a Mysterian who seems to hold the view that it is this mysterious origin that serves as the 
foundation of our ability to value someone or something and that with the possibility of providing a 
certain explanation and the option of manipulation this valuation and appreciation would cease.  
The problem with Fukuyama’s position is thus two-fold. On the one hand, it seems to employ 
biologism in order to establish species-typical traits as the foundation of equal rights. On the other 
hand he reverts to mysterianism to argue that a cryptic and indefinable Factor X gives humans 
dignity. Both Factor X and species-typical traits are endowed with a normative binding force that 
precludes biotechnological modifications.159 Both positions seem untenable and even incompatible 
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with each other. 
 
Bioconservative concerns over the ethical and social aspects of human enhancement technologies 
bear great importance, however, this is certainly not the point dividing the two camps. Whereas 
transhumanists look for the broadest possible, yet ethical use of these technologies bioconservatives 
reject them in the name of protecting human nature. Nonetheless evoking naturalness as a source of 
normativity is unfounded. This type of argumentation – as we have seen – results in biologism and 
circumvents the most crucial question, namely why naturalness should serve as a normative 
instance.   
It seems that arguments that consider enhancement technologies to be an assault on 
humanity, though they are intuitively plausible are nevertheless either unable to offer an acceptable 
notion of what this assault consists in and how the inherent value of humanness should be 
conceived of, or they can not be precise enough about the technologies they deem unacceptable. 
Both Habermas and Fukuyama speak in quite general terms about enhancement and make 
derogatory remarks about “wild fantasies” that motivate some “crazy” science-fiction scientists. 
Unfortunately, this level of generality in discussing transhumanist/posthumanist aspirations is 
insufficient especially when put against claims of such great dimensions as the threat of 
istrumentalization and dehumanization. 
 
Polyvalent Human Nature 
 
As we have seen the concept of human nature plays a crucial role especially in bioconservative lines 
of argumentation that seek to establish it as a source of normativity. Thus, human nature should 
serve the role of erecting a boundary that must not be crossed by technological, manipulative 
efforts. So far I have tried to argue that these attempts ultimately fail and result in a form of 
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biological essentialism that is difficult if not impossible to maintain. However, human nature is a 
polyvalent term and it can be and has indeed been employed to argue for the opposite position as 
well, namely self-transformation. As Kurt Bayertz notes, as opposed to animals it is characteristic of 
human nature that it is not merely a product of evolution but is constantly changed by human action 
itself. In that sense it is “artificial by nature”, which means that any attempt to discriminate natural 
and thus legitimate from artificial, that is illegitimate forms of manipulation must fail.160,161 One 
might even say that it belongs to our nature to change our nature, which is an often repeated idea 
since the birth of humanism. 
 Also, ever since Aristotle famously defined man as a “rational animal” the relationship of 
the two concepts rationality and animality has been a central topic in the history of Western 
philosophy. As already noted in the first chapter, for Aristotle, striving for perfection was a defining 
element of all things and activities. Yet, he also thought of ‘nature’ as eternally fixed and human 
activities as parts of this nature that could bring about that what nature would by mimicking it. So 
the capacity of self-perfection that resides in humans is directed at unfolding that, which is inherent 
in human nature itself. It is this inherent telos that humans ought to bring about and because the 
differentia specifica of humans consists in their rationality or reason, perfection is importantly 
related to our contemplative faculty. 
 Later, especially in the 18th century a rather different relationship between nature and reason 
emerged that is most vividly evidenced by Kant’s reformulation of Aristotle’s definition. As we 
have already seen in the previous chapter man was no longer animal rationale but rather animal 
rationabile. Here being human is understood as the task of unfolding reason and becoming that what 
we – in a sense – already are. Yet as David Heyd notes this task has to be understood as directed in 
some sense against nature, since that realm is determined and guided by laws whereas humans are 
characterized by freedom. The reasons Heyd gives for this are firstly an increasingly mechanistic 
and scientific understanding of nature and second a denaturalized understanding of reason as the 
uniquely human faculty and the seat of freedom. For example, Heyd quotes Rousseau, who was also 
a major inspiration for Kant. 
According to Rousseau, the philosophical basis for the polar distinction between ‘‘the will’’ and ‘‘the 
senses’’ lies in the fact that while ‘‘physics explains in some way the mechanism of the senses and the 
formation of ideas,’’ the power of free will or choice is found in ‘‘purely spiritual acts about which the 
laws of mechanics explain nothing’’162  
The uniqueness of humans consists in them being – at least partly – free from natural determination 
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in virtue of their transcendental reason.163 So, the task of human perfectibility consists in unfolding 
human freedom and reason in opposition to the determined world of nature. A similar conflict takes 
shape in Kantian ethics in the form of the tension between animal-like natural inclinations and 
moral duty. This line of thought is a central source of reference for thinkers who argue that 
biotechnologies, by making nature malleable finally provide us with the means to rid ourselves 
from the shackles of determination and unfold freedom.  
In the next sections I will discuss relevant techno-progressive authors who argue along 
similar lines and then I will try to show why using science to overcome nature and unfold human 
freedom ultimately results in an irresolvable paradox. 
 
Destined for Redesign 
 
At about the same time when Francis Fukuyama completed his book Our Posthuman Future 
Gregory Stock, the director of UCLA’s Program on Medicine, Technology and Society also 
published his thoughts on our imminent technological self-transformation under the title 
Redesigning Humans. The two authors also went on a rather combative lecture tour to propagate 
their books and have often encountered one another in public discussions that embodied the 
polarized debate between proponents and opponents. In my view a rather striking difference 
between the two approaches is that Fukuyama attempts – however unsuccessfully – to provide 
reasoned arguments for his case and pleas for the use of legal and political means to take a different 
course. On the other hand Stock’s book, which is filled with technical details and prospected paths 
of future development nicely illustrates what after Baylis and Roberts we can call the inevitability 
thesis. In their article The Inevitability of Genetic Enhancement Technologies Baylis and Roberts 
outline a number of arguments that speak against the use enhancement technologies. They list ones 
similar to those I have concerned under Habermas and Fukuyama, but also others like the problem 
of unjust distribution, cutting back on funding for other important research, further individualizing 
disease instead of focusing on social factors, etc. They conclude that 
There is no evidence as yet, however, that these arguments in particular, or any other 
arguments, however well developed, will suffice to stop the refinement and use of genetic 
enhancement technologies. As it happens, contemporary Western democracies have no 
experience with permanently halting the development and use of any enhancement 
technology on ethical grounds. 164 
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The most crucial reason that Baylis and Roberts give for this likely trend is their assumption that 
„the essential characteristics of humanness are perfectibility and the biosocial drive to pursue 
perfection”165 make it impossible to stop.  
Gregory Stock uses a very similar rhetoric to argue for the inescapable arrival of 
enhancement. In particular he stresses two points. Firstly that enhancement technologies are 
inseparable from mainstream biomedical research supported by almost everyone. As he says: 
The coming possibilities will be the inadvertent spinoff of mainstream research that virtually 
everyone supports. Infertility, for example, is a source of deep pain for millions of couples. 
Researchers and clinicians working on in vitro fertilization (IVF) don't think much about the 
future of human evolution, but nonetheless are building a foundation of expertise in 
conceiving, handling, testing and implanting human embryos, and this will one day be the 
basis for the manipulation of the human species.166 
In this respect his position is consistent, for he points out that all future reproductive technologies 
are predicated on the use of IVF, hence the relevant boundaries have already been crossed. 
Interestingly, he even admits and says out loud those conclusions that other authors either try to 
conceal or present in the form of a positive argument. Stock is very straightforward about stating 
the reasons most likely to drive enhancements. 
The possibility of altering the genes of our prospective children is not some isolated spinoff of 
molecular biology but an integral part of the advancing technologies that culminate a century 
of progress in the biological sciences. We have spent billions to unravel our biology, not out 
of idle curiosity, but in the hope of bettering our lives. We are not about to turn away from 
this.167 
So he does not strike any utopian chords or indulge in wild fantasies but attempts to present the case 
of human enhancement as the logical and unavoidable consequence of modern science and 
biomedicine. Enhancement is a further expression of scientific progress and it is simply 
unimaginable and impossible that we not seize this opportunity; especially given the fact that we 
have made considerable financial investments.  
It must be acknowledged that Stock has a valid point on the issue of continuity between 
mainstream research and enhancement. A number of current therapeutic developments and research 
projects under way can easily transform into enhancement. A simple example again is that of 
prosthetic limbs that over time as biomimetics and biomechanics progress are likely to become far 
superior to human extremities. Cochlear implants and aids for the seeing-impaired may also one day 
surpass the sensitivity of the human ear and eye. This striking conclusion is even true if we consider 
one of the most far-fetched visions of human augmentation, namely the uploading to or recreation 
of human consciousness in artificial systems. Current day applications in deep brain stimulation as 
well as research in the field of artificial neural networks are predicated on the assumption that 
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conscious phenomena are the results of brain activity, which consists of neural mechanisms, that is: 
information processing. Once brain activity is seen in terms of information processing it can in 
principle be simulated in computer systems.168 Already today there are massive research projects 
underway that want to create artificial versions of animal cortical columns169 and many scientists 
are busy trying to create chip replacements of different brain regions. The first major breakthrough 
in this area came with the development of an artificial hippocampus, an area of the brain that plays 
an important role in the mediation of long-term memories.170 These chips differ from earlier 
implants in that they don’t merely stimulate the brain but replace the function of damaged tissues. 
This means that the idea of “consciousness in silicon” is a part of neuroscience and not an 
extrapolation of science fiction enthusiasts. Furthermore, it also means that enhancement is also an 
immanent possibility as computer systems are more easily modifiable than brain cells. Stock is also 
aware of these possibilities but on the issue of neural implants and brain-computer interfaces he is 
far more sober and committed to the complexities of flesh and tissues than some other visionaries, 
like Ray Kurzweil. Stock is more focused on using biotechnologies to prolong life and germ line 
technologies to eliminate disease and enhance humanity. 
Besides claiming that enhancements will be spinoffs of mainstream research Stock’s second 
interesting point is his belief that the inevitability of enhancements is due to our inability to do 
anything against them. So he radically downplays the relevance of all our possible instruments of 
influencing technological development. 
Our technology is evolving so rapidly that by the time we begin to adjust to one development, 
another is already surpassing it. The answer would seem to be to slow down and devise the 
best course in advance, but that notion is a mirage. Change is accelerating, not slowing, and 
even if we could agree on what to aim for, the goal would probably be unrealistic.171 
So the crux of his argument is that it is impossible to do anything in advance. He seems to construe 
technological development as an autonomous system that has come to implicate the transformation 
of humans as well and it would be naïve to think that we can halt or control this process in any way. 
He rejects the possibility of global consensus on regulatory questions, considers the development to 
be too fast to keep up with and believes that any local regulation would only move application and 
research somewhere else. This understanding of technology as an autonomous system holds that in 
effect no one is in control and no one can be in control because of the immense complexities 
involved. On this view of technology, despite the fact the humans create the technology once it is 
                                                 
168
 Bear, M., Connors, B., W., Paradiso, M., A., Neuroscience: Exploring the Brain, Lippincott Williams&Wilkins 2007. 
169
 See the homepage of the Blue Brain Project at the  École Polytechnique in Lausanne. http://bluebrain.epfl.ch/ 
Last retrieved 20 August 2010 
170
 Graham-Rowe, D., World's first brain prosthesis revealed, New Scientist 12 March 2003. 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn3488-worlds-first-brain-prosthesis-revealed.html Last retrieved 20 August 
2010 
171
 Stock op. cit. p 11 
 55 
available and extant it has a life of its own. Each actor, governing body or organization has insight 
into only a fragment of the entire process that develops independently.172  
However, while Stock rejects the possibility of oversight and control he is nevertheless more 
specific about some of the forces he sees as driving the developments. These are consumer desire 
on the one hand and economic competition on the other. His favoured example evokes a kind of 
cultural clash between Western countries and China. Stock echoes the currently widespread 
predicament that China is probably on the ascendancy to become the next major global power. 
If the manipulation of human genetics seems a necessary step along that path, Western 
sensitivities and policies are unlikely to stand in the way. And once a single major nation 
embraces so foundational a development as this, others would soon have to follow, however 
reluctantly, to avoid being left behind.173 
Here again, Stock may have a point as it is a well studied phenomenon that Chinese population 
policy since the 1970s has heralded the twin goal of reducing quantity while increasing quality and 
they have not refrained from eugenic counselling practices that would be unimaginable in the West 
today.174 The Chinese approach has even been dubbed “authoritarian Transhumanism.”175 However, 
the philosophically relevant issue is not whether Stock is right in his predictions and justified in 
lumping “the West” in one bloc and pitting it against “China”, but rather that he considers 
technology to be completely beyond human control and shaped by economic competition.  
 But Stock’s position is far more intriguing, or should I say confusing than this. Towards the 
end of his book he strikes a different tone that echoes many of the utopian disciples of enhancement 
I have discussed in the first chapter. Here, his view of man is that of a creature constantly remaking 
itself. For Stock our journey of self-transformation is not merely a physical but also a deeply 
spiritual endeavour. Our time is a historic time of transition; one in which we may „be able to 
transform ourselves into something „other”.”176 Rejecting this magnificent opportunity would in his 
view be tantamount to denying our essential nature and probably failing our destiny.  
Ultimately, such a retreat might deaden the human spirit of exploration, taming and 
diminishing us. […] Exploring human biology and facing the truths we uncover in the process 
will be the most gripping adventure in all our history, and it has already begun. What emerges 
from this penetration into our inner space will change us all177  
There are many striking features to this depiction. For one, the use of the word „tame” is interesting 
if we contrast it with that of Sloterdijk who thought of humanism and, in a provocative manner, 
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biotechnologies as taming the bestiality and barbarism inherent to human nature. As opposed to this 
Stock sees human nature as essentially curious, explorative and ready for adventure such that 
uncovering the mysteries of human biology is likened to a great exploration where we face 
countless dangers but eventually emerge triumphant, assured in the comforting feeling that we have 
overcome yet another barrier. He often reverts to images of this kind comparing biotechnological 
research to previous exploratory adventures. It would thus be a crippling of human nature not to 
penetrate into its own core. This is also a rather peculiar image that immediately calls to mind 
Francis Bacon’s famous lines about the nature of scientific research. 
But if any man there be who, not content to rest in and use the knowledge which has already 
been discovered, aspires to penetrate further; to overcome, not an adversary in argument, but 
nature in action; to seek, not pretty and probable conjectures, but certain and demonstrable 
knowledge;—I invite all such to join themselves, as true sons of knowledge, with me, that 
passing by the outer courts of nature, which numbers have trodden, we may find a way at 
length into her inner chambers178 
The masculinist orientation of science and the identification of nature with a woman who has to be 
conquered has been a prominent topic in the feminist critique of science. Sandra Harding has argued 
for example that such metaphors are not merely formal elements of scientific reasoning that serve 
the psychological function of making communication easier without affecting the theory. Rather 
such metaphors of dominating women are constitutive elements of the theory and can only be 
explanatory because they depict some shared aspect in the interpersonal world. Such metaphors 
feed upon and strengthen the hierarchical relationship between men and women.179 Of course, 
reproductive technologies are highly ambivalent and bear great liberatory potential especially for 
women, but Stock’s use of the notion of „penetration” in relation to reprogenetics is still somewhat 
perplexing. 
 Penetrating into our inner space is curious for another reason. It suggests that we can almost 
take an external position in relation to „who we really are” – which is understood in biological 
terms – and behold it as an object. Almost as if we were somehow different from that what we 
behold as ourselves. Who we really are, our humanness thus becomes our object of study and 
manipulation. However, Stock is quite ambiguous on this issue as he also stresses that we will 
necessarily change so it might be hasty about drawing conclusions.  
[Redesigning ourselves] is neither an invasion of the inhuman, threatening that which is 
human within us, nor a transcendence of our human limits. Remaking ourselves is the 
ultimate expression and realization of our humanity. […] Adaptable as we are, to remain at 
home in the world we are forming, we will have to adjust ourselves to cope with it.180 
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Despite the fact that he explicitly rejects the view that we shall transcend human limitations he 
believes that once sophisticated technologies are available most people will not want to remain 
“natural” and that those who do shall become the likes of “relics from an abandoned human 
past.”181 
Until we get there we should employ market mechanisms and above all try to keep 
governmental interventions out of the business of germinal choice. As Stock says, we should fear 
totalitarianism, nationalism and government, and not enhancement technologies. Thus his position 
is a strange mixture of technological determinism, market triumphalism and an understanding of 
human nature as essentially characterized by the desire to overcome itself. I now turn to a 
discussion of Nick Bostrom and transhumanism more closely to illustrate an even more radicalized 
stance and the position furthest away from bioconservative authors. 
 
From Enhancement to Posthumanity 
 
I have already briefly introduced Nick Bostrom at the end of the first chapter. He is currently 
Professor of philosophy at Oxford University and Head of the Future of Humanity Institute. His 
work has greatly contributed to transhumanism becoming a respected or at least unavoidable 
position in relevant debates. He also belongs to the founders of institutionalized transhumanism.  
The two concepts transhumanism/posthumanism are sometimes used interchangeably 
though they can have very divergent meanings. For the moment I can say that transhumanism – as 
mentioned in Chapter One – is the belief that humanity currently represents a transitory stage in the 
evolutionary process and that we can and should use technologies to hasten our development.182 
The term posthuman is closely linked to this idea as some transhumanists hold that technological 
progress will enable a step change beyond humanity that is going to be so profound as to move us 
beyond the current form of the human altogether, in a very literal sense.  
Besides “promoting rational thinking, freedom, tolerance, democracy, and concern for our 
fellow human beings”183 the central occupation of transhumanism is to encourage the application of 
technology in order to transcend our current limitations. The aim is to achieve technological 
mastery over our own nature thereby attaining a post-human state of existence. This would consist 
in possessing “intellectual heights as far above any current human genius as humans are above other 
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primates.”184  Posthumans would be  
[r]esistant to disease and impervious to aging [they would have] unlimited youth and vigor 
[and could] exercise control over their own desires, moods, and mental states [as well as] be 
able to avoid feeling tired, hateful, or irritated about petty things.185 
There are many paths that might take us to posthumanity and Bostrom has published intensely on 
almost all of them. Just as Gregory Stock he also subscribes to the idea that all our projected 
enhancements are in perfect accord with currently held scientific views about the nature of the 
universe.  
Bostrom, along with other transhumanists considers death itself to be the most severe limitation of 
human flourishing. In his popular Fable of the Dragon Tyrant Bostrom likens death to an eternally 
hungry monster to whom a human city has to make grave sacrifices every year until their ruler is 
finally convinced to construct a powerful weapon to kill the beast.186 Bostrom uses the context of 
the fable to ridicule bioconservative positions that argue against life extension. 
Spiritual men sought to comfort those who were afraid of being eaten by the dragon (which 
included almost everyone, although many denied it in public) by promising another life after 
death, a life that would be free from the dragon-scourge. Other orators argued that the dragon 
has its place in the natural order and a moral right to be fed. They said that it was part of the 
very meaning of being human to end up in the dragon’s stomach. Others still maintained that 
the dragon was good for the human species because it kept the population size down. To what 
extent these arguments convinced the worried souls is not known. Most people tried to cope 
by not thinking about the grim end that awaited them.187 
This argument suggests that we do should do everything in our power to fend off death, and 
concentrate our efforts at scientific research that would specifically aim at life extension. One such 
researcher who is active in the field of biogerontology and fights a rather lonely crusade for funding 
for life extension is Cambridge scientist Aubrey de Grey. In his words 
Aging of the body, just like aging of a car or a house, is merely a maintenance problem. And 
of course, we have hundred-year-old cars and […] thousand-year-old buildings still 
functioning as well as when they were built […] At the very least, the precedent of cars and 
houses gives cause for cautious optimism that aging can be postponed indefinitely by 
sufficiently thorough and frequent maintenance.188 
Of course, de Grey adds that this is likely to take extremely long as the complexities and unforeseen 
difficulties involved can not be compared to those related to a vintage car. But he sticks to the 
principle and in conclusion of his book states that the important thing is the gradual postponement 
of death. He calls this longevity escape velocity, which is the „threshold rate of biomedical progress 
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that will allow us to stave off aging indefinitely”.189 The idea is that we would always have to live 
just a bit longer, so that we are still in time for the next life extension breakthrough.  
It is truly remarkable that transhumanists in the early 21st century are articulating visions 
that almost literally resemble those of Russian Biocosmists from a century ago. Yet there are also 
crucial differences. Whereas Biocosmists saw their project as a part of a broad undertaking to 
remedy the injustice of temporal limitations and guarantee that all human beings could share in the 
coming communist society, current transhumanists want personal immortality simply to stay young, 
healthy and beautiful forever. Their definition of the posthuman also echoes a commitment to this 
ideal of a life without any form of constraint, hindrance or conflict and a devotion to a battle against 
the ephemeral nature of life. „Perhaps an extreme reflection of the California desire to remain 
forever young in the sun”190 Also, immortality is no longer the business of states but of individuals 
and companies specialised in providing life extension services. 
Another especially important topic is the development of information technologies, which in 
one sense are the catalysts of progress in other domains as well. Transhumanists often make 
reference to a trend observed by Gordon Moore, a former chairman of the world’s largest microchip 
manufacturing company Intel. Moore observed in the 1970s that the number of integrated circuits 
on computer chips doubled about every two years, leading to an exponential increase in processing 
speed. The trend itself has now accelerated and doubling time is about 18 month. The way the 
average person encounters this trend is that computers keep getting smaller and smaller with their 
performance increasing while their price remains more or less constant. This has come to be known 
as Moore’s Law.191 Even though it is at best a trend transhumanists refer to it as a rock-solid fact 
and base their predictions and assumptions on the continued validity of Moore’s Law. If it holds 
true artificial intelligence is expected to achieve magnificent levels in the coming years. Some 
critics would remark, that AI promises have already skyrocketed during the 60s when human level 
computers and HAL-9000 were “just around the corner”.  
Despite scepticism from a number of circles some prominent researchers still stick to the 
idea of creating artificial general intelligence192 even though the approach may have shifted from a 
simple representationalist view of cognition that considered linguistic competence as the hallmark 
of intelligence to a different conception.193  Thus transhumanists still count with the possibility that 
sophisticated robots will one day pass an extended version of the Turing-Test that not only includes 
the ability to lead an intelligent conversation but also every other form of interaction with the world. 
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This prospect involves complex philosophical issues such as the problem of “grounding”. That is: 
even if complex motor and sensory capabilities are solved how is it that the artificial system comes 
to generate “meaning”? What will ground the meaning of symbols in a computer/robot to the 
world?194 In general transhumanists ultimately revert to the tactic of “eventually”, meaning that they 
delegate the solution of complex conceptual problems to technological advancement and increase in 
complexity.195 Hence, one way of creating posthuman entities leads through AI and involves 
completely artificial beings. As a result the question of the legal and moral status of such beings is 
an intensely debated topic among transhumanis.196  
With the advancement of computer science in tandem with neuroscience it might also 
become possible to upload human consciousness into computer systems and achieve cyber-
immortality. Once individual human identity is preserved – so the argument goes – we can live 
eternal lives and transfer ourselves into various different substrates, such as advanced robotic 
bodies. The feasibility of this procedure is one of the most highly discussed issues within the 
transhumanist community. The prospect of this form of transcending biology is linked to the 
question of the multiple realizability of conscious states. This issue had been introduced by the 
functionalist philosophy of mind of Hilary Putnam in the 1960s.197 I have already stated earlier that 
multiple realizability – which essentially treats the mind as a software and the brain, computer or 
other physical substrate as the hardware – is to some extent inherent in contemporary neuroscience, 
as evidenced by reverse-engineering and modelling attempts. However, multiple realizability and 
the question of copying an individual’s mind are different issues because the process of reading the 
brain and “setting it to motion” in a different environment are both conceptually and technologically 
unresolved issues and we only have educated guesses at the moment.198 
Nanotechnology also plays a key role and has found its way into visions of human 
enhancement. Ray Kurzweil often describes a scenario in which hordes of nano-scale robots travel 
through the human body healing cells and linking directly to our nervous system. In this scenario 
the man-machine merger is literally complete, since perception, action and vital functions are all 
mediated through the technological system provided by nano-bots. For Kurzweil, this technology 
also represents a possible path towards life in fully immersive virtual environments. In his vision, 
we could switch between different virtual locations and our actual physical one, overlay many on 
top of each other anytime and change our personae from site to site thus experimenting with 
                                                 
194
 See for example: Clark, A., Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again, MIT Press, 1998. 
195
 See for example Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines, Penguin Books, 1999. 
196
 See for example Hughes, J., Citizen Cyborg: Why Democratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human of 
the Future, Westview Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004 
197
 See Putnam, H., ‘Psychological Predicates’, in Capitan, W., H., Merrill, D., D.,  (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion, 
University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh , 1967, pp. 37-48. 
198
 Anders, Sandberg; Nick, Boström (2008). Whole Brain Emulation: A Roadmap. Technical Report #2008‐3. Future 
of Humanity Institute, Oxford University. http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/Reports/2008-3.pdf Retrieved 21. August 2010 
 61 
different embodiments.199 
 
Besides unquestioned faith in the progress of science and technology these visions share an idea of 
the human as the shaper of its own future development. Transhumanists echo earlier notions of 
participant evolution and seem to have a teleological understanding of the evolution of intelligence 
that necessarily involves moving on to the next stage of development.200 In this sense we have to 
understand the post in posthumanism in the very literal sense that our own actions and interventions 
into our evolution eventually bring about our own disappearance. In the succinct formulation of 
Marvin Minsky, one of the great legends of artificial intelligence: 
Will robots inherit the earth? Yes, but they will be our children. We owe our minds to the 
deaths and lives of all the creatures that were ever engaged in the struggle called Evolution. 
Our job is to see that all this work shall not end up in meaningless waste.201 
Thus our duty is to advance to arrival of more sophisticated beings who will owe their existence to 
us but shall no longer be constrained by that factors that limited humans. Yet, there is also a strange 
form of continuity posited. As Bostrom says transhumanism holds that  
[c]urrent human nature is improvable through the use of applied science and other rational 
methods, which may make it possible to increase human health-span, extend our intellectual 
and physical capacities, and give us increased control over our own mental states and 
moods.202   
In some strange sense we will be in control of the posthuman being we ourselves are about to 
become. As Ian Hacking argues thinkers in the cyborg tradition ever since Clynes and Kline who 
have proclaimed technological mastery over the body can be seen as radical dualists. This view 
considers the biological body to be the original prosthesis that could be altered and amended 
without in any way affecting the human essence, which seems to consist mainly in freedom and in 
the delights of an unconstrained mind.203 When reading such contemporary transhumanists as Ray 
Kurzweil or William Sims Bainbridge, one can not escape the impression that a strong dualism is 
indeed characteristic of their thinking. According to Kurzweil, progress in nanotechnology will 
enable us to replace a host of our organs such as the gastrointestinal system, the heart, the lungs, 
etc., with artificial ones of increased functionality. As he claims, “ultimately we will become more 
nonbiological than biological.”204 We can even change our brains to better performing ones in order 
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to keep up with the immensely rapid technological change around us. Thus, in accord with the 
original meaning of the term “cyborg” we are about to modify ourselves in order to better suit our 
technologically transformed environment. This time, it is not space travel but the world we have 
created for ourselves, but does not necessarily seem hospitable anymore. As authors like Kurzweil 
or Bainbridge argue eventually and seemingly inevitably humans shall become more than human, 
transcending biology altogether. The vulnerable, imperfect and temporally limited nature of bodily 
existence in itself constitutes a form of deficiency, which may be overcome by submitting the body 
to rational control. In transhumanism the body is considered to be merely an accidental, original 
prosthesis that can be freely transformed and amended, whereas the mind is taken to be essential 
and ultimately dissociable from its material base in the form of information patterns. This 
postbiological, posthuman “life”-form that is no longer bound by “flesh” is often described with 
metaphors like, 
[t]he transition from flesh to data will not be so much metamorphosis as liberation 
[…] When we emerge into cyberspace, we should no more lament the loss of the 
bodies that we leave behind than an eagle hatchling laments the shattered fragments 
of its egg when it first takes wing.205 
Hence, the ultimate realization of human potentials would be to shed the current form of human 
existence entirely. Yet, this would not be metamorphosis, but liberation. It would finally signal the 
moment when humans are free. I believe this emancipatory aspiration is the very core of 
transhumanist thought. I also believe that this image is deeply flawed and wrought with 
paradox. In the next chapter I will present an argument as to why I believe this is so and look for 
different possibilities of thinking posthumanism. 
 
The ‘Schizophrenic’ Nature of the Posthuman 
 
As we have seen, for transhumanists the ultimate realization of human potentials would be to shed 
our current form of existence entirely. This seems to confirm that transhumanists who 
embrace this possibility subscribe to a dualistic logic. Ultimate mastery over the limiting world of 
the flesh is finally achieved when the mind can sever its’ biological bonds. Thus, a disembodied 
notion of conscious agency is avowed. According to Katherine Hayles, as the mind is hypothetically 
divorced from the body and dissolved in patterns of information that can travel freely between 
different substrates, the potentially liberatory effects of technology are subsumed under the classical 
mind/body dualism. For Hayles transhumanism in this respect seems to be heir to a liberal humanist 
understanding of the subject that perceives the mind to be essential, while the body merely 
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accidental. Yet, as Hayles eloquently argued, cyborgization is not a means to extend liberal 
humanism – it seems rather to subvert and undermine it. According to her,  
[c]onscious agency has never been "in control." [...] Mastery through the exercise of 
autonomous will is merely the story consciousness tells itself to explain results that 
actually come about through chaotic dynamics and emergent structures. If […] there 
is a relation among the desire for mastery, an objectivist account of science, and the 
imperialist project of subduing nature, then the posthuman offers resources for the 
construction of another kind of account.206 
 
For Hayles then, the posthuman offers a perspective beyond the traditional dichotomies of classical 
humanism, regardless of whether actual technological manipulations have been made on the body. 
This is a radically different sense of posthumanism. As we can see, a fundamental characteristic of 
this understanding is a shift in the conceptualization of subjectivity, away from the notion of a 
controlling disembodied unitary agency. Nonetheless, transhumanism seems to be immune to this 
understanding. So much so, that a foundational text of the movement explicitly states, that the belief 
in achieving posthumanity simply due to shifts in our self-understanding is a “confusion or 
corruption of the original meaning of the term.”207 Changing some aspects of our self-conception 
will not suffice, for true posthumanity is achievable only by radically modifying our brains and 
bodies.  
Yet, an unintended consequence of the destabilization of solid categories and the dissolution 
of human nature as a constant given, which is provoked by cyborg technologies is precisely that 
classical dualist conceptions become untenable.208 Even everyday practices of biotechnology 
demonstrate clearly that the idea a subject gaining control over objective nature is illusory, for such 
interventions are never aimed merely at a body, but constitute the manipulation of an entire human 
being. In light of this, statements from transhumanist authors about our increasing ability to control 
our own nature and the interpretation of this ability as the true unfolding of human potentials, 
mastery and freedom seems to be somewhat self-contradictory. This contradiction lies in the fact 
that the very essence that is presumed to be liberated, namely subjectivity – which transhumanists 
equate with the mind and intelligence – is itself naturalized and becomes part of the realm of 
manipulable entities. Technological mastery over our own nature presupposes the existence of 
something beyond the technologically manipulable, yet, the condition of possibility for 
presupposing that is dissolved by technological naturalization itself. There is no one to take wings 
and leave the shackles of the egg behind, because the supposed external controller of the processes 
                                                 
206
 Hayles, K., N.,  How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics, University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999,  p. 288 
207
 Bostrom, N., op. cit. 
208
 Weiss, M., G., The Body of Phenomenology; Unforeseen Phenomenological Outcomes of Biotechnologies, The New 
School of Social Research, The Husserl Archives in Memory of Alfred Schütz, On The Future of Husserlian 
Phenomenology, http://newschool.edu/nssr/husserl/Future/Part%20Two/Weiss.html Last retrieved 20 August 2010 
 64 
of transformation is also implicated in the change. 
The vision of humanity emerging from transhumanist prophecies is thus a rather peculiar 
one. On the one hand, posthumans are free and liberated entities, complete masters of themselves 
who thus enjoy an unbounded subjectivity. On the other hand, they are utterly transparent in the 
sense that they are open to technological manipulation up to the minutest detail. Following Louis 
Sass I would like to interpret this vision in terms of a “schizophrenic” duality. In the section on the 
polyvalence of human nature I have already discussed the important shift in the understanding of 
nature and reason that had taken place during the 18th century in the philosophies of Kant, Rousseau 
and others that involved the denaturalization of reason. This means that the most essential human 
characteristic, namely reason – in order to save it from the deterministic realm of nature and ensure 
the freedom of will – was conceptualized in transcendental, non-natural terms. At the same time the 
only source of meaning, structure and order in the world was also perceived to be human reason. 
According to Foucault Kantian philosophy introduced a new kind of reflexivity by virtue of which 
reason, the mind or subjectivity became simultaneously the prime object of inquiry and the inquirer 
as well. In The Order of Things Foucault discusses the episteme or ‘mode of thought’ characteristic 
of modernity. According to him modernity gave rise to an understanding of man as an empirico-
transcendental doublet, in the sense that the condition of knowledge became the object of empirical, 
rational study while it also served and was upheld as a transcendental foundation.209 The situation of 
the mind contemplating itself, its’ nature and origins is indeed a somewhat paradoxical 
constellation. The precondition of knowledge studies itself as given to itself in the form of an 
object. Foucault traced the birth of this doublet to Kantian philosophy, which stressed the 
constitutive role of subjectivity and the mind in forming the world of phenomena. On the other 
hand, the fact that Kant identified concrete categories by which the mind shaped the world of 
experience culminated in the scientific study of the mind, accompanied by naturalistic notions. As a 
result, the mind had been gradually transformed into a mere object among other objects, and as a 
natural entity it became amenable to manipulation. It served as the precondition of knowledge and 
at the same time an object of study and intervention; the quasi-omnipotent knower and the 
calculable known.  
Psychologist Louis Sass takes this doublet as the basis of providing an interesting 
phenomenological interpretation of schizophrenia. As he says 
There is a strange duality lodged at the heart of the schizophrenic condition. On the one hand, 
such patients tend to lose their sense of active intentionality and integrated selfhood. Instead 
of serving as a kind of anchoring centre, the self may be dispersed outward, where it 
fragments into parts that float among the things of the world; even one’s most intimate 
thoughts and inclinations may appear to emanate from some external source or mysterious 
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foreign soul—as if they were ‘the workings of another psyche’ […] On the other hand, the 
patient’s own consciousness can come to seem pre-eminent and all-powerful: one’s own 
consciousness may seem poised at the controlling centre of the universe, with everything 
arrayed about it as around some constituting solipsistic deity.210 
Sass does not intend to give an account of the aetiology of schizophrenia but rather wants to grasp 
the nature of the experience. Drawing on psychiatric accounts of the disease since it was first 
described as well as literary depictions Sass establishes a link between the phenomenology of 
schizophrenia and the doublet of modernity described by Foucault. As a side note I want to mention 
the peculiarity of the fact that according to some theories of this highly ambiguous disease, 
schizophrenia was first described in 1800 which puts Sass’s analogy in an interesting light.211 For 
him, both the schizophrenic experience and modern thought consist in “a characteristic veering 
between a bracing sense of absolute epistemic omnipotence, omniscience and freedom; and an 
equally compelling experience of the self as limited, determined and blind.”212 In effect it is a 
tension between competing yet simultaneously present interpretations of oneself as a limited and 
determined object that is scientifically knowable on the one hand whilst also being the sole source 
of knowledge, experience and meaning.  
Such patients claim to have a nearly divine intelligence yet to be incomparably stupid; to have 
limitless powers yet to be completely impotent; to be God himself yet to be nothing more than 
the beeping of a computer that was programmed during their sleep213 
 
[a] schizophrenic person is as liable to identify himself with god as with a machine, perhaps 
the most emblematic delusion of this enigmatic illness is of being a sort of God-machine, a 
kind of all-seeing, all-constituting camera eye.214  
I believe it is this very duality that is manifest in the visions of technologically enabled posthumans. 
In exactly the same manner do posthumans seem to be God-machines – free and omnipotent entities 
that are at the same time entirely transparent and manipulable. My first impression upon reading 
these lines from Sass was that such an experience must be like a condensed and mind-blowing state 
of actually living the unbearable tensions implicated by naturalization as it crushes against our self-
perception as autonomous beings who are in some sense distinct from everything science can 
describe; as the knowledge of the fact of being objectively describable and know-able hits upon our 
sense of subjectivity. Much akin to scenes from science fiction films like Blade Runner or Ghost in 
the Shell, were figures contemplate whether they are actually real or merely made, whether it can be 
known and most importantly whether it matters. 
 What, if any conclusion can be drawn from this analogy?  
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If the transhumanist discourse of radical emancipation and liberation by technologically subduing 
nature results in a paradoxical figure that is both omnipotent and impotent then we might as well 
follow Hayles’ suggestion and search for a different notion of posthumanism. In order to resolve the 
above tension we might try to look for accounts that construe the relationship between subject and 
object differently, so that the mind, will or autonomous subject are not separated from the object; 
where the distinctions and dichotomies of nature and culture, artificial and organic, human and non-
human collapse. For such an understanding I now turn to Donna Haraway’s concept of the cyborg 
and Katherine Hayles’ interpretation of the posthuman. 
 
Ambiguity and Co-Evolution, Cyborgs and Posthumans 
 
Contemporary philosophy of science as well as the social study of science offer possibilities and 
perspectives that go beyond those essentialist notions that even today greatly inform both 
bioconservative and technoprogressive thinkers in the debate over enhancements and human nature. 
Interestingly, the two terms cyborg and posthuman that are so crucial in the debate I have briefly 
introduced so far also have fundamentally different interpretations.  
In her pathmaking essay from 1985 A Manifesto for Cyborgs Donna Haraway creatively 
appropriated the term cyborg and elaborated an understanding that is way beyond its original 
meaning. If we recall, the cyborg was a term coined by scientists Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline 
who were researching the possibilities of adapting human physiology for space travel by creating 
feedback loops between organic and artificial systems. Clynes and Kline, as I have already 
mentioned understood the breaching of boundaries between organic and artificial systems that is 
implicated by this research at a merely technological, even technocratic level. Haraway took the 
concept of the cyborg and theorized it not merely as an artefact of technoscience but as something 
that in a sense grasps the human condition in late 20th century. In her famous formulation 
By the late twentieth century, our time, a mythic time, we are all chimeras, theorized and 
fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are all cyborgs. The cyborg is our 
ontology; it gives us our politics.215 
At the heart of Haraway’s notion of the cyborg is the idea that the boundaries that Western thinking 
has relied on for so long, such as between the organic and the artificial, the human and the animal, 
and between the physical and the non-physical are progressively breached by technoscience. 
Whereas the focus of philosophy has always been on that what separated us from animals and 
machines these distinctions and pure categories that have hitherto been deemed so constitutive of 
our self-understanding are now increasingly blurred, fleeting and indefinable. The idea of the 
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“human” as a category of beings that can clare et distincte be separated from the web of other 
entities is an illusion. A part of the title of a later interview with Haraway that paraphrases Bruno 
Latour – We Have Never Been Modern – brings the point home in an especially succinct manner: 
“We have never been human”216, meaning that we have never been that autonomous, pure and 
ontologically closed entity we took ourselves to be.  
Haraway also reflects on the history of the cyborg in the sense that she recognizes it as a 
product of militant capitalism, the space race and wartime frenzy in which the paradigm of 
Mutually Assured Destruction loomed high. She tries to divorce the cyborg from this cloud of 
meanings and truly appropriates the term. In accord with the manifesto-nature of the text she calls 
for a different understanding so that  
a cyborg world might be about lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid 
of their joint kinship with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities 
and contradictory standpoints.217 
So the cyborg is about embracing plurality, fracture, ambiguity and fluid boundaries not just in the 
realm of the social but straight to the level of our biology. Even though this previous sentence of 
mine was very un-cyborgian because of treating so distinctly and hierarchically social and other 
levels, when Haraway’s crucial point is that nature and culture are only separable as the result of an 
act of division but they are not separate. In order to better express this she later introduced the term 
naturecultures.218 Naturecultures is also about the cohabitation and co-evolution of humans with 
machines and animals yet it already slightly signals her move away from the cyborg and into what 
she came to call companion species and then dog studies. For Haraway, the cyborg was a 
historically situated figure that had a specific purpose, namely to think about the possibility of 
critique and the future of feminism in the emerging regime of informatics and the rearranging 
landscape of technoscience and the transformation of capitalism under the Reagan Star Wars era.  
I am very concerned that the term ‘cyborg’ be used specifically to refer to those kinds of 
entities that became historically possible around World War II and just after. The cyborg is 
intimately involved in specific histories of militarization, of specific research projects with 
ties to psychiatry and communications theory, behavioral research and 
psychopharmacological research, theories of information and information processing. It is 
essential that the cyborg is seen to emerge out of such a specific matrix.219 
For Haraway the term “cyborg” has by now lost its critical potential. Hers was a call to use this 
militaristic being to demonstrate everything it was not intended for and to inhabit “more livable 
worlds”. The cyborg was contaminated to the core and part of its purpose was precisely to challenge 
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purity and unquestionably origins. By now, Haraway has “come to see cyborgs as junior siblings in 
the much bigger, queer family of companion species“.220 
 Yet, the cyborg has taken on a life of its own and even developed its own „field” of 
cyborgology.221 While it has received countless interpretations in one important and perhaps even 
widespread sense the cyborg has come to stand for the idea that humans and technology are co-
constitutive thereby questioning classic dichotomies. It is in this – admittedly curbed and simplified 
– sense that I am using it as well. 
 Another figure, partly owing its existence to Haraway’s cyborg is the posthuman. Though 
this term has also already surfaced quite often, it has always assumed the meaning of a 
technologically enabled stage of human evolution where current Homo sapiens is superseded by 
vastly more improved beings. This is the transhumanist version of the story that ultimately 
culminates in the vision of disembodied minds merging and surging in cyberspace. For Haraway 
this represents “blissed-out techno-idiocy”222 from which she certainly distances herself on all 
occasions.  
In her highly influential book How We Became Posthuman N. Katherine Hayles provided a 
critical reading of the history of cybernetics from its inception up to current day research in robotics 
and artificial life in order to explicate a different understanding of the posthuman. She was largely 
motivated by her consternation over the notion of uploading consciousness that is so central to 
transhumanism. She begins her story in the 1940s and ‘50s when a group of scientists, such as 
Norbert Wiener, Warren McCulloch and Claude Shannon, regularly held meetings which later came 
to be known as the Macy Conferences. The aim of these gatherings was to create a model of 
communication and control that would be equally applicable to animals, humans and machines. 
Central to this general theory were the concepts of the feedback loop between the system and its 
environment, and that of information. Information came to be defined as a bodiless entity, extracted 
from its material base, which can travel freely through different substrates.  
Shannon's theory defines information as a probability function with no dimensions, no 
materiality, and no necessary connection with meaning. It is a pattern, not a presence… The 
very definition of information, then, encodes the distinction between materiality and 
information that was also becoming important in molecular biology during this period.223 
Hayles is careful to note that Shannon considered his theory to be a description of how messages 
can be transmitted in an effective manner, and not a general theory of “meaning”. However, coupled 
with McCulloch’s neural networks and von Neumann’s work on computers, the concept of 
information has given rise to a way looking at all systems, including humans as essentially 
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information processing entities. The decontextualizing move that lies at the heart of the concept of 
information – as it treats information out of context and divorced from meaning – was a perfectly 
legitimate step in the context of defining the theory. However, as she argues, taken out of context it 
gave rise to the idea that information can travel freely between different kinds of material 
substrates. It is this double-decontextualization, elevating an element of the theory to a generalized 
claim that she critiques.  
Thus, a simplification necessitated by engineering considerations becomes an ideology in 
which a reified concept of information is treated as if it were fully commensurate with the 
complexities of human thought.224 
Hayles’ book is thus in a sense an attempt to deconstruct this ideology in order to treat information 
at its proper place. For Hayles the posthuman is thus not, or should not be the continuation of 
classical humanism but signals the end of it. As she says: 
If my nightmare is a culture inhabited by posthumans who regard their bodies as fashion 
accessories rather than the ground of being, my dream is a version of the posthuman that 
embraces the possibilities of information technologies without being seduced by fantasies of 
unlimited power and disembodied immortality, that recognizes and celebrates finitude as a 
condition of human being, and that understands human life is embedded in a material world of 
great complexity, one on which we depend for our continued survival. 
Thus both Haraway and Hayles attempt to overcome classic dichotomies in the direction of 
situatedness and embodiment.  
When reading these lines carefully it must have occurred that I have – perhaps not even very 
subtly – changed the focus of inquiry. Whereas the issue of enhancement by mainly 
biotechnological means was foregrounded earlier, this chapter has mostly discussed cybernetics, 
information and computer science. I want to quickly explain this detour. The reason is simply that 
both of these concepts, the cyborg and the posthuman stress the consequences of cybernetics and 
information technologies more than biology. Yet if we understand them as perspectives beyond the 
nature/culture, subject/object divide they offer a way of looking at enhancements or the man-
technology merger more generally from a different vantage point; namely, from that of co-
constitution and relationality. From this perspective it becomes clear that technologies neither 
intrude upon us and violate originary purity, nor allow us to bend nature according to our own will. 
So if our relationship to technology is characterized by deep ambiguity, if it is not, in Haraway’s 
words “either/or” but rather “neither/both” then we may start to rethink the questions concerning 
enhancement as well. What kind of an image confronts us once we construe technology as 
something that constantly shapes how we think about ourselves and indeed that what we are?  
Both Haraway’s cyborg and Hayles’ posthuman entailed a very strong commitment to 
embodiment, experimentation, and openness. This may be more true of such technologies as virtual 
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reality, sensory augmentation or the extension of the body via prosthetics and implants but, as I will 
try argue in the next chapter the current state of affairs suggest that in the case of biotechnologies 
besides undeniable openness there are very strong tendencies that recapture and challenged it 
toward normalization and the creation of an increasingly managed, surveilled and supervised body. 
Hence, I will now turn to a discussion of the current biopolitical landscape, keeping in mind that we 
are all posthumans. 
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 - Chapter 3 - 
 
Posthuman Biopolitics 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
Now that I have given a brief account of the contemporary and rather stalled debate about our 
imminent posthuman future and drawn attention to problems at the core of the quarrel I would like 
to shift the focus of inquiry to the biopolitical landscape that is inhabited by “us posthumans.” 
I am going to start by giving a brief account of the concept of biopolitics followed by a sketch of 
some technological developments that bare significance it. 
 I will then discuss two tendencies I consider to be crucially important. The first is the 
individualization of risk thinking that goes hand-in-hand with a notion governmentality literature 
has come to call “the neoliberal subject.” Then I will make an attempt at outlining a current 
technology of the self that is structured around the notion of ‘anxiety’.  
 The second trend concerns what Martin Weiss has called the ‘dissolution of human nature’. 
It describes the growing malleability of biological processes on the one hand and also the dispersion 
of knowledge of this biological body in diverse databases, biobanks, probabilities and 
susceptibilities. 
In both instances I will richly draw on examples of current technologies to illustrate my 
points.  
 72 
Biopolitics 
 
I have already briefly touched upon the multifaceted concept of biopolitics in the first chapter when 
discussing Russian Cosmism. Now I am going to give it a somewhat more detailed consideration. 
In a lecture at the College de France in 1976 Michel Foucault first discussed the concept of 
biopolitics, which he described as a technology of power that emerged at the end of the 18th century. 
Biopolitics is a form of biopower, which is characterized by an attempt to administer and monitor 
the life and vitality of populations. Biopolitics was born when the management of life entered the 
realm of political calculations and when state control gradually took hold of the biological life of 
populations in the name of increasing and optimizing vitality.225  
  For Foucault the emergence of biopower signalled a transition from classic sovereignty that 
in his characterization was symbolised by the sword and the ability to take life. Sovereignty 
manifested itself mainly as an instance of threat and exploitation that had the power to appropriate 
the goods, work and blood of its subjects. The paradigm of biopower no longer restrains, cuts and 
curbs but rather seeks to control expand and arrange life itself.  
The transition from sovereign-, to biopower marks a significant change in the overall 
structure of exercising power. Among other things Foucault located the source of this 
transformation in the increased agricultural and industrial production of the time as well as growing 
scientific and medical knowledge. At about this time societies confronted new challenges. 
Especially from the 19th century onwards famine and pestilence were not primary troubles. 
Concerns over increasing economic productivity and improving the quality of the population and 
hence of the workforce gained prominence. Foucault’s notion of biopower consists of two poles 
connected by a bundle of intermediary sites.  
One technique is disciplinary; it centers on the body, produces individualizing effects, and 
manipulates the body as a source of forces that have to be rendered both useful and docile. 
And we also have a second technology which is centered not upon the body but upon life: [...] 
this is a technology which aims to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, 
but by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal 
dangers.226 
Foucault saw a crucial precondition of the rise of capitalism and the constitution of modern nation 
states in the combination of disciplinary powers of individual control and regulatory powers of the 
population.227  Complementary to the disciplinary techniques of anatomo-politics that seek to 
control and condition the individual body at various sights, such as schools, prisons, etc., this set of 
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techniques is thus focused on the biological life of the human species qua species. Both forms of 
power function eminently through the creation of norms and grades of deviation and as Foucault 
says they are not mutually exclusive but rather mutually constitutive.228  
 Biopolitics is unseparable from the idea of protecting life from the dangers within. Thus it 
also entails an important shift, away from battling large epidemics that used to haunt societies prior 
to the relative security brought about by the 18th century. Endemics, or internal factors that 
threatened the health and productivity of nations progressively took center stage.229 As Foucault 
argued, this rearrangement of state rationality also meant that the protection of the ‘human stock’ 
gained crucial relevance. Racism, which Foucault defined as "the break between what must live and 
what must die"230, the fear of biological decline, degeneration and classical eugenics are all 
paradigmatic examples of this biopolitical logic. 
 Foucault’s notion of biopolitics has exerted considerable influence on a number of thinkers 
and has become the object of constructive critique as well. Feminists, most notably Haraway have 
criticized that Foucault’s concept of ordering, arranging and managing bodies still very much 
remains captivated by the notion of a unified and closed body.231 However, especially after the 
1970s and 80s, when he discussed the concept, significant changes have occurred that made it 
necessary to conceptualize the body as a more fluid, porous entity as Haraway herself tried to 
articulate it with the cyborg. In the wake of such critiques and more recent technoscientific 
developments Foucault himself could not have anticipated current scholars who draw on his work 
such as Nikolas Rose, Catherine Waldby, Thomas Lemke or Sarah Franklin take this fragmented, 
dissolving and lived body as the starting point of their investigations. So for example Franklin’s 
work has revealed the utterly cyborgian nature of embryos as beings that are “others” and “us” at 
the same time while her work also critically engages with global biopolitics. 
its coming into being is both organic and technological. Though it is fully human (for what 
else can it be?), it is born of science, inhabits the timeless ice land of liquid-nitrogen storage 
tanks, and feeds on special (pure) culture in its petri dish. At once potential research material 
(scientific object), quasi-citizen (it has legal rights), and potential person (human subject), the 
embryo has a cyborg liminality in its contested location between science and nature.232 
 
Despite a number of justified points of critique, important questions which Foucault considered 
central for his work, namely the topics of subjectification and power/knowledge relations continue 
to inspire. The growing field of governmentality studies takes Foucault’s notion of power as a 
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productive rather than merely repressive force that creates subjectifications as its premise. This field 
of inquiry is located at the intersection of cultural anthropology, history of science and feminist 
scholarship.233 It developed in the wake of Foucault’s concept of governing and his ”michrophysics 
of power”. According to these, one   
[…] has to take into account the interaction between those two types of techniques - 
techniques of domination and techniques of the self. He has to take into account the points 
where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to 
processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to take into 
account the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion or 
domination. The contact point, where the individuals are driven by others is tied to the way 
they conduct themselves, is what we can call, I think, government.234 
Within governmentality studies the notion of the “neoliberal subject” is of high relevance and I 
believe it is also eminently important in relation to the topic of enhancement. Therefore I will now 
turn to a discussion of this rather ambiguous concept. 
 
Choosing Ourselves – The Neoliberal Subject 
 
Neoliberalism is a highly versatile, often quoted yet seldom understood concept that has gained 
enormous currency especially since the most recent global financial crisis that may have signalled 
the end of the so called ‘neoliberal era.’ I certainly do not claim to be any authority on the issue so 
my interpretation will represent one – most probably highly simplistic – understanding among 
many.  
 Usually, neoliberalism is equated with a very strong commitment to self-regulating global 
free markets, crippled government regulation and the model of the economic man. In this sense, it is 
the grandson of classical liberalism, with its emphasis of infallible, laissez-faire markets and 
autonomous individuals making informed choices. Neoliberalism’s chief commitment can also be 
abbreviated into the D-L-P formula, which stands for: 
“(1) deregulation (of the economy); (2) liberalization (of trade and industry); and (3) privatization 
(of state-owned enterprises).”235 Yet neoliberalism also brought a large scale reconstruction of state 
rationality and indeed the public sphere as well. It introduced competitiveness, self-interest, and 
constant quantified quality controls into every sphere, as well as “the creation of highly 
individualized, performance-based work plans; and the introduction of ‘rational choice’ models that 
internalize and thus normalize market-oriented behaviour.”236Its ascendance to prominence came in 
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the 1980s when Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US rose to power and 
attempted to act upon the crises of the 70s. They interpreted this crisis as the failure of 
Keynesianism, big government and the strong welfare state.237 The new philosophy of individual 
responsibility instead of social solidarity was most emphatically expressed by Margaret Thatcher’s 
famous statement that there's no such thing as society, only individual men and women who must 
first and foremost care for themselves.238 
From a governmentality perspective it becomes clear that beyond deregulation, the 
dismantling of welfare provisions and structural adjustment policies neoliberalism also entailed a 
certain concept of what man is or should be. It is not merely a retreat of the political in favour of 
economics. By extending the logic of economics into almost every domain of life in an increasingly 
globalized and turbulent world the images of an enterprise culture and that of the entrepreneurial, 
flexible self were born.239 Flexible, enterprising individuals were needed to keep the economy 
flourishing. Such persons had the benefit of having ‘no strings attached’ and could therefore adapt 
very quickly to changing market needs.240 The image of the enterprising individual is premised on a 
view of the self as autonomous, choosing, rational; someone who pursues its own life-plans 
according to its own values and priorities. 
The self is to be a subjective being, it is to aspire to autonomy, it is to strive for personal 
fulfilment in its earthly life, it is to interpret its reality and destiny as a matter of individual 
responsibility, it is to find meaning in existence by shaping its life through acts of choice.241 
In fact the level of self-fulfilment an individual has achieved has been “elevated to the status of an 
evaluative criterion”242 such that living an active, rich, productive and fulfilling life are positioned 
almost as moral values. The current “flexible” capitalism thus incites individuals to initiate as many 
“projects” as possible. As Nikolas Rose put it “contemporary individuals are incited to live as if 
making a project of themselves […] to develop a ‘style’ of living that will maximize the worth of 
their existence to themselves.”243 Of course, the new freedoms, possibilities and promises of self-
realization that are driving neoliberal individualization go hand in hand with very specific ideas 
about how to put these freedoms to use, namely in an economical, risk-minimizing, productivity 
enhancing manner.244 
Interestingly, as I have already noted at the end of the first chapter, the 1980s was also the 
time when a very new and individualized form of utopianism emerged in the form of 
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transhumanism. Early visionaries echoed quite precisely the neoliberal call to boundless self-
realization, which they thought best achievable in a free-market system. They may be seen as the 
first who have extended project-thinking to the level individual biology as well.  
Thus we have an interesting contradiction before us. The concepts of the cyborg and the 
posthuman have significantly stressed fracture and the dissolution of stable and fixed identities and 
unitary selves. Yet, as Nikolas Rose notes, at the very moment when countless accounts of the 
passing and demise of the image of the self as stable, unified and autonomous emerge in philosophy 
and social theory 
regulatory practices seek to govern individuals in a way more tied to their 'selfhood' than ever 
before, and the ideas of identity and its cognates have acquired an increased salience in so 
many of the practices in which human beings engage245 
Thus regulatory practices address people ever more “as if they were” the kind of autonomous, 
individualized selves motivated by the desire of self-fulfilment.246 This duality will be a key 
feature of the contemporary biopolitical landscape. 
 During the 1980s and 1990s the principle of self-governance and individual responsibility 
also gained prevalence in relation to issues of health. As Herbert Gottweis notes, the “idea of the 
managing of the self is also reflected in a multitude of technical and organizational novelties within 
healthcare, in which managed care is the most important and most paradigmatic example.”247 Thus 
responsibility and individualized project thinking also extend to the level of managing our 
biological constitution, preferably in a prudent, responsible and calculating manner. This type of 
managerial attitude towards individual biology also represents a shift from a mere preoccupation 
with disease to the management of normalcy itself. 
Before turning to a discussion of this development and other features of the biopolitical 
landscape I want to briefly sketch a very important shift in molecular biology and genetics that 
bears a significant influence for governing practices. 
 
From Genetic Determinism to Genetic Susceptibility 
 
In the 1970s geneticists discovered that DNA consisted of so called coding and non-coding regions, 
which they labelled introns and exons respectively. Non-coding DNA has also been labelled “junk 
DNA” because no clear role could be assigned to it, so the assumption was that it served as a kind 
of redundant buffer.248 Up until the completion of the Human Genome Project the majority of 
                                                 
245
 Rose, N., Inventing Ourselves, Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 169. 
246
 Ibid. 
247
 Gottweis, H., Regulating genomics in the 21st century: from logos to pathos?, TRENDS in Biotechnology Vol.23 
No.3 March 2005 p. 118. 
248
 Rheninberger, HJ., Müller-Wille, S., Technische Reproduzierbarkeit organischer Natur – aus der Perspektive einer 
 77 
geneticists also thought that it was possible to use a schematic argumentation that proceeded from 
DNA to RNA to proteins to cells. This unidirectional model could in principle explain the structure 
and function of organisms. This has come to be known as the Central Dogma of molecular 
biology.249 In effect, this is a deterministic model that was inherent to the metaphor of the genetic 
code. This conceptualization was a classic example of what we might call a depth-surface ontology 
where the visible surface features of the phenotype were defined by the invisible, underlying 
genetic code.  
These views of a unidirectional flow as well as the genotype-phenotype distinction have 
been questioned ever since they first emerged. However, they have been largely discredited by the 
time of the completion of the Human Genome Project. This decline is somewhat ironic, because the 
grand project was motivated by the belief that the genotype/phenotype relationship can finally be 
clarified. Thus, after almost exactly 100 years following the rediscovery of Mendelian inheritance 
in 1900, this reductionist view has faded. It has turned out that what scientists believed to be junk 
DNA does after all play a significant role in such crucial events as “the timing of processes that 
occur during development, including stem cell maintenance, cell proliferation, apoptosis 
(programmed cell death), and the occurrence of cancer and other complex ailments.”250 
 Whereas about twenty years ago it was possible to believe that the sequence of base pairs 
contained all the information necessary to crack diseases, develop miracle cures and set genetic 
engineering on a glorious path the Central Dogma of genetics is now a thing of the past and genes 
have been reduced to a much more humble role in heredity.251 It is remarkable though, that criticism 
of the Central Dogma had been present in a number of other disciplines such as clinical genetics, 
developmental biology, population genetics or cell biology. These disciplines have held that 
sequencing the genome would provide us little to no knowledge about disease onset, course and 
treatment.252 How the Human Genome Project could still get under way with massive promises in 
terms of cures is rather mysterious, but does not belong to the topic of this thesis. I only wish to 
remark that Carlos Novas’ term “political economy of hope”253 neatly captures how the overblown 
promises of a scientific discipline could get a multi-billion dollar global research project underway 
despite massive criticism that finally even turned out to be correct. 
 In either case, the new catch-phrases are postgenomics, proteomics and epigenetics that shift 
the emphasis away from the genetic code itself to the complex factors that regulate gene expression 
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and involve RNA, proteins and the cellular milieu itself.254 As Margaret Lock writes:  
With increasing energy, the attention of many researchers is focused on a new space situated 
between the genotype and phenotype, a site where “endophenotypes” […] make their 
appearance and arguments about causality based on linearity and determinism make no sense. 
Recognition of the contributions of individual development, aging, and the environment to 
activity at the molecular level has dethroned the preordained genetic body and set in its place 
a much more fluid, elusive entity.[…] Organisms are clearly more than the sum of their 
parts[…], and it is now undeniable that genes determine very little, if anything, and are 
merely actors in an extraordinarily complex scenario.255 
This transformation is of major significance because it fundamentally makes arguments predicated 
upon genetic determinism irreversibly outmoded. As a result of this rearrangement a new focus has 
emerged that takes genetic susceptibilities as its target with considerable implications for 
governance practices. 
 
“at risk” – Being Genetically Responsible  
 
Currently, biopolitics is characterized by at least two, seemingly contradictory tendencies. On the 
one hand, we see the ever expanding importance of individual care and self-governance and the 
expectation to exercise prudent individual choice. On the other hand, we see the dissolution of the 
individual in bodily markers, biobank data and biological processes. These two trends – and 
probably a number of others that are not the focus of attention here – are simultaneously present. 
Thus, while the very notion of an autonomous, bounded, choosing self is dissolving, regulatory 
practices appeal more and more to this very image of the prudent, self-governing individual.  
 One site where this change is easily graspable is the focus of postgenomics to act upon 
susceptibilities. A new style of reasoning has emerged that takes an individuals susceptibilities to 
certain diseases as the basis of action in the present. If grand-scale eugenics programmes have been 
supplanted by consumer driver liberal eugenics, then analogously the orientation of liberal eugenics 
is no longer the population at large but rather individual predispositions. At the intersection of 
discourses on individual risk, genetification, and the promissory culture256 surrounding biomedical 
possibilities we see the birth of individuals “at genetic risk.” Such individuals have been identified 
to carry a predisposition for diseases with a genetic component. Being at risk may be understood as 
having a certain susceptibility to develop illnesses that affect the individual or close kin.  
The identification of risks may be precise, as in the case of Huntington’s chorea or 
probabilistic, as in the case of breast cancer and most other complex diseases. This identification is 
possible before any symptoms are manifest, which leads to a new ‘category’ of persons who are 
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“asymptomatically ill.” Despite their perfectly normal condition and maybe even without much 
certainty about whether they will ever develop a specific disease these individuals often find 
themselves entangled in the web of biomedicine and subjected to surveillance and preventive 
measures. They are incited to take a proactive stance towards their biological constitution. As Rose 
writes,  
[…] the reorganization of many illnesses and pathologies along a genetic axis does 
not generate fatalism. On the contrary it creates an obligation to act in the present in 
relation to the potential futures that now come into view.257 
This obligation to act arises where the image of prudent, self-governing individual confronts 
discourses of individual risk. Gaining knowledge, and to a far lesser extent, a possibility to 
intervene and act put individuals in a position where they need to reconsider some of their bonds to 
others, most notably to potential future kin. They are invested with ‘genetic responsibility’ that 
influences their identities and social relationships.258 
It would be a form of life where the responsible citizen would have the obligation to know 
and manage his or her life of susceptibilities – a kind of permanent management of genomic 
uncertainties. 259 
I believe this example beautifully highlights the features of our post-human condition. The image of 
the post-human lifeform taking shape in front of us is neither that of the dehumanized and 
instrumentalized being stripped of its essence that Habermas and Fukuyama fear, nor the 
technologically enabled posthuman reshaping itself at its own fancy. Rather, we confront ‘prudent’ 
individuals who recognize their embeddedness in growing webs of interaction that tie them to their 
ancestors, their potential offspring and to a number of other potential kin through the mediation of 
technoscientific knowledge and practices. I believe this reading would foreground the positive and 
liberatory aspect that is, doubtless, implicated by this technology. Biology has to some extent 
become open to intervention and is longer the equivalent of destiny. It might serve to exemplify that 
people are incorporating knowledge about a certain – biological – aspect of their existence into their 
lives and acting upon it in a responsible manner.  
However, I believe the all-pervasive presence of the neoliberal narrative of self-governance 
in the sake of productivity casts some serious shadows over this interpretation. The problematic 
developments implicated by the shift towards the search for susceptibilities are obvious for example 
in the field of environmental health research. As Lemke states,  
While research in this field traditionally concentrated on identifying external risk factors that 
pose health problems to employees, more and more scientific emphasis is put on recognizing 
internal risks of personal susceptibilities that are based on the genetic makeup of 
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individuals… Since there are more and more genetic tests for different conditions available, 
there is a real danger that employers might use genetic information to determine how 
“genetically fit” someone is for a job.260 
 
Somatic Individuality 
 
One of the consequences of the biotechnology revolution is that our biological constitution is 
becoming increasingly relevant and thematised along the lines of a valuable asset. Catherine 
Waldby has introduced the notion of ‘biovalue’, which “refers to the yield of vitality produced by 
the biotechnical reformulation of living processes.“261 Such living processes are stems cells, 
embryos, bacteria and other forms organisms which can be utilized to create a surplus of life and 
monetary value as well. We can also see the growing valorisation of the body and biological traits 
themselves. Who we are is increasingly defined by our biological make-up and by the proactive 
stance we take in relation to our natural endowments either in the form of acting upon risks or by 
constantly striving for improvement. As our self-understanding comes to be shaped by biomedicine 
and by the actual and promised possibilities of biotechnologies even our understanding of 
personhood is being interpreted “by others, and by ourselves, in terms of our contemporary 
understandings of the possibilities and limits of our corporeality.”262 
“Somatic individuality”263 is the term Nikolas Rose uses to describe thinking of 
individuality in bodily terms. This allows for the body to serve as a fundamental site of acting upon 
ourselves, by the means provided mostly by biomedicine. Somatic individuals are „beings whose 
individuality is, in part at least, grounded within our fleshly, corporeal existence, and who 
experience, articulate, judge, and act upon ourselves in part in the language of biomedicine.”264 The 
growing importance of this somatic side to our lives is evidenced by the myriads of discourses 
surrounding health, the body, suffering, dieting, exercising, flourishing, etc. This trend even extends 
to our mental lives as our psychological ‘inner space’ is increasingly mapped upon the brain. This 
opens interventions into personality traits at the molecular level.265 An interesting case in point is 
for example the use of the psychiatric drug Prozac that has caused quite some turbulence when it 
first hit the markets. As Peter Kramer noted in his controversial book Listening to Prozac a number 
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of patients who took the medication felt as if they were finally restored to their true selves.266 It is 
an interesting observation that highlights how technological interventions that dislocate the natural 
– namely the original neurochemical balance of the brain – merge with the sensation of authenticity. 
Hence, this authenticity is at least partially the result of a technological intervention in nature, 
which was originally experienced as somehow “false”. 
As our biology becomes more open to choice and as we learn to act upon it and integrate 
knowledge about it into our lives, we simultaneously become responsible for the design we choose 
for our bodies.267 With the possibility of intervention comes inevitable responsibility.268  
In fact, the reorganization of illnesses along a genetic axis also entails that fundamental 
notions, such as autonomy are reinterpreted. In order to be autonomous and act prudently one must 
take genetic information into account since failure to do so would not be seen as an individual act of 
choice but rather the demonstration of profound irresponsibility.269 Biotechnological enhancement 
may be understood in this framework as a manifestation of neoliberal governmentality, in which the 
political goals of improved productivity are intertwined with self-technologies aimed at securing, 
optimizing and improving individual health and well-being. Developing Foucault’s concepts of 
discipline and biopolitics further Rose terms the type of politics that forms around the governance 
of somatic individuals ethopolitics. 
If discipline individualizes and normalizes, and biopower collectivizes and socializes, 
ethopolitics concerns itself with the self-techniques by which human beings should judge 
themselves and act upon themselves to make themselves better than they are.270 
He describes this as an ethic that is centred around the notion of maximizing potential health and 
quality of life and which entails that those individuals who, for whatever reason, do not take part in 
this project are adjudicated negatively.271 
 I believe the concept of somatic individuality captures a very important development. In the 
next section I will attempt to contribute to the further elaboration of this idea by discussing an 
aspect Rose leaves mostly unreflected, namely the destabilizing effect of becoming somatic 
individuals within a biopolitical landscape that is suffused by the dread of risks and insecurities. I 
now turn to what I would like to call the anxious individual, or anxious subject. 
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The Anxious Individual 
 
There are many ways of understanding anxiety. On the one hand, it is an affective state of unease, 
worry and restlessness that seems to lack any specific directedness and which is probably common 
to most of us. This feeling of ‘homelessness’ has also played a central role in the existentialist 
philosophies of Søren Kierkegaard272 and Martin Heidegger.273 Here, the free floating, ungraspable 
and indefinable feeling of anxiety constitutes the fundamental condition of being human. It is 
through the torments of anxiety that the depths of life are revealed. For these thinkers anxiety is 
essential and productive for it is the precondition of human freedom and deep reflection, wherefore 
anxiety needs to be faced and lived rather than evaded. 
 On a slightly different note, anxiety has been associated with the discontent brought about 
by modernity itself. Processes of modernization loosen traditional bonds, introduce relativism and 
seem incapable of providing a framework of meaning for the lives of individuals beyond a bleak 
vision of progress, which itself has been largely shattered by the cataclysms of the 20th century. It is 
a recurrent theme in a number of writers since the 19th century both in the U.S. and in Europe to 
condemn their age as one of anxiety and uncertainty.274 Anxiety has been considered an expression 
of the individual’s struggle in a world she perceives to be ‘wrong’ in a profound sense. The idea that 
the very form of life characteristic of modern societies engenders feelings of insecurity has a fairly 
long history such that by the end of the last century it had become something of a commonplace.  
Decisions made in a biomedical context can be seen as ‘existential choices’, which 
necessarily give rise to great anxiety. This anxiety doesn’t merely represent a quantifiable factor in 
risk calculation, but is rather a fundamental concern for the integrity of one’s life. 
 I believe we can also understand anxiety somewhat analogous to a technology of the self in 
a Foucauldian sense that emerges as a result of current practices aimed at reshaping our relation to 
our bodies. According to Foucault’s definition technologies of the self 
permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of 
being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, 
purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.275 
By discussing anxiety, or the anxious subject below I want to contribute to Nikolas Rose’s term 
somatic individuality by adding a further shade to it. Somatic individuality does not merely mean 
that our individuality is increasingly experienced and acted upon in the language and means 
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provided by biomedicine. I believe it also entails certain tensions as our current biopolitical 
landscape, which is permeated by the idea of ‘risk’ brings forth a specific norm, namely the norm of 
constant worry and rumination over one’s biology. Of course, worries exist also, more broadly 
about political, environmental and other risks. It is important to note that I am not arguing for the 
case that individuals have necessarily become more anxious in the psychological sense.276 I also 
believe the dynamics at work here are not like everyday fear of disease or ill-ness. Rather, it seems 
to me to be the case that certain analogies exist between states of anxiety and forms of self-
governance.  
One such analogy is the increased concern with which we deal with our biological existence. 
The internalization of the norm of restless concern has almost become an integral part of our notion 
of responsibility. The term ‘anxious subject’ is in my view an adequate one because the type of 
worry that current discourses of risk instil is not necessarily targeted at anything specific, or perhaps 
targeted at everything in relation to our biological existence, which thus becomes something quite 
elusive. Being concerned and worried about our bodily state in general becomes the norm, which 
then manifests itself in myriads of different forms.  
The increasing role that our biological characteristics and bodily well-being play in making 
sense of our identity simultaneously destabilizes the lived experience of the body. As Martin Weiss 
argues, previous discourses of genetic determinism solidified a certain biological destiny, but they 
also allowed the affected person to develop an attitude of acceptance and learn to live with the 
given. Contrary to this, discourses of susceptibility seem to construe the whole of an individual’s 
biological constitution as a source of risk, as something that poses potential threats unless carefully 
supervised,277 even though the outcomes of this supervision are often quite uncertain. 
Of course, in a certain sense the body has always been a source of great anxiety because at 
some fundamental level it is beyond the individual’s rational control and its signs and signals serve 
as the most vivid reminders of our vulnerable, fragile and ephemeral nature. However, the 
phenomenology, the lived experience of the body has thus far remained mostly uncontested, 
whereas now categories such as ‘at risk’ or ‘presymptomatically ill’ dislocate, or at least contest 
first-person experiences by claiming to speak the language of scientific objectivity. Discourses on 
genetic susceptibility further exacerbate this, for they incite the individual to counter a possible but 
vague future and act in the present, whereby the actual effects of the actions taken also remain 
unclear. The real outcomes of preventive measures can never be fully known. 
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Experiences of derealization and depersonalization – during which one’s body or 
surroundings are experienced as frighteningly alien – often form symptoms of anxiety disorders.278 
This sense of derealization seems analogous to the kind of dissociation that risk thinking and the 
objectification of every aspect of bodily functioning involve. The same way severely anxious states 
may involve that one feels estranged from the world or one’s body, so too does being ‘at risk’ 
dissociate experience from ‘scientific fact’. To belong to the group of the presymptomatically ill 
entails that one’s first person account of herself and her health contradicts that of medical discourse. 
In essence the person is alienated from her own lived experience. Furthermore, probabilistic 
accounts of risks are generally perceived to be alien from everyday thinking and therefore very 
difficult to grasp and integrate, while putting forth a strong claim to authority.279  
The ever broadening spectrum of medicalization is also a strong catalyst of this process. As 
more and more phenomena come to be viewed as belonging under medical jurisdiction – such as 
birth, (successful) ageing, reproduction, nutrition, beauty, physical and intellectual fitness, 
emotional life, etc. – more and more areas of life require our prudent, active engagement and 
careful concern. We also become more dependent on medical vocabularies to make sense of our 
own experiences. This, in effect leads to a form of constant self-monitoring, which is also quite akin 
to that of anxious states. To exaggerate the situation slightly, I could say that each and every sign of 
the body, signs of its functioning, ageing and change become invested with great meaning and may 
be interpreted as potential (medical) problems that need attention and conscious intervention.  
An interesting demonstration of the way this regime of anxious self-concern may become 
normalized is provided by Carmen Baumeler’s analysis of ‘affective computing’ that may also be 
seen as a form of enhancement system. Such, as of yet hypothetical systems are wearable 
computing devices that monitor stress related physiological changes in order to help prevent 
cardiovascular disease. The system is also linked to a centre where an individual health expert 
monitors the values and via video link gives advice on how to manage distress and negative 
emotions. In an example the user devotes a considerable amount of attention to the handling of her 
stress levels and checks in to see her values about 5 times a day. According to Baumeler “this 
application demonstrates, [that] users are supposed to manage stress themselves and, therefore, stay 
healthy and productive.”280 The author intends this example to show how the individualization of 
emotion management is linked to the production of the ideal ‘flexible worker’.281 The objectifying 
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gaze directed at one’s own body, this constant rumination, the drive to check, recheck and double-
check to see whether everything is OK according to some scientifically established criterion is also 
the hallmark of anxious self-concern. This example seems to be the paradigmatic expression of the 
responsible/anxious subject of the future.  
Similarly, in my view a number of current developments suggest that the expectation to 
internalize this objectified account of our vitality and well-being is growing. So for example we see 
calls to adjust our dietary and training habits to objectively quantified values, which has been 
dubbed “living by numbers.”282 Also, future developments in medical imaging and monitoring 
promise the convergence of medical devices with smart phones and handheld computers, such that 
“monitoring your vital sins 24/7/365” will become the routine.283 These depictions testify to an 
image of the person who is constantly preoccupied with optimizing her status of health by reverting 
to medical technologies. Interestingly, they are also in my view essentially “solipsistic” 
technologies in the sense that this form of surveillance takes the individual as an entity that is 
sufficiently characterized by such data as heart rate, breath rate, blood sugar, pulse, etc. that are 
taken to mean something essential regardless of context. 
Thus they do not merely offer a technology but establish a certain norm that channels the 
lived experiences of embodiment into the manageable realm of having a scientifically supervised 
body. It creates the norm of constant concernedness with the appropriate functioning of the body 
that is also greatly driven by the expectations of flexibility, efficiency and productivity. 
I believe the notion of the anxious individual may serve to exemplify how self-practices are 
shaped to live up to the task of properly, prudently and responsibly managing our biological 
constitution under a regime of preventive medicine. This form of subjectivity emerges at the 
intersection of discourses on risk, susceptibility and prudent self-management.  Becoming somatic 
individuals in an age of risk also involves internalizing the norms of anxious self-concern. 
 
While there are individual risks we may also speak of collective risks like those that threaten whole 
communities or perhaps even mankind itself. With the already noted shift towards communitarian 
principles, an interest in population protection and the intertwined nature of self-governance with 
the primary preventive logic of state rationality we see that individual worries and fears may very 
well be employed for the sake of protecting communities. Thus, attempts at identifying people who 
present risks to broader society are also on the rise. We find calls for the creation of population wide 
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forensic genetic databases,284 programs to screen for potentially dangerous personality disorders285 
and the introduction of such measures as the Indeterminate Public Protection Sentence in the UK in 
2003.286 This leads me to a discussion of the other major trend of the current biopolitical landscape, 
namely the dissolution of the body in patterns of dispersed information. These developments bring 
out other dangers involved in the widespread use of screening technologies, namely that they  
have the potential to lead to a less optimistic future, in which widespread screening for 
biomarkers of future psychopathology or undesirable conduct, notably those made possible by 
developments in genetic profiling and brain-scanning, would lead to a significant increase  in 
preventive interventions in the name of public protection.287  
 
The Dissolution of Human Nature 
 
While neoliberal narratives constantly reinforce the role of personal choice, individual autonomy 
and self-governance we also see signs to the contrary. For example, in an article about the future of 
bioethics Ruth Chadwick and Martha Knoppers argued that there is currently a shift towards 
communitarian principles in bioethics, which means that the individual, while still serving as a 
crucially important factor will lose its centrality.288 One of the principle reasons the authors give for 
the rise of communitarian principles is the growing relevance of population-wide genetic research 
programs “that call for rethinking the paramount position of the individual in ethics.”289 
In relation to this Martin Weiss has argued that recent biotechnological developments have 
dismantled our previous understanding of ‘human nature’ as something solid and unchangeable and 
have made it fundamentally malleable. Instead human nature now stands for a wide array of 
biological traits, susceptibilities, neurotransmitter levels and so on. The individual is in a certain 
sense deconstructed and finds itself dissolved in all these data that are preserved in large and 
anonymous biobanks. Gottweis also considers decorporalization a crucial element of current 
biopolitics as the materiality of the body is dissolved in large databases into informational entities 
and statistical probabilities.290 According to Weiss this dissolution of the subject is complemented 
by the dissolution of the classical form of state sovereignty as biopolitical grand projects are things 
of the past and have given way to a dispersed network of performative discourses that 
                                                 
284
 Townsend M., Ashtana, A., Put young children on DNA list, urge police, The Guardian Online, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2008/mar/16/youthjustice.children  Last accessed 21. January 2010. 
285
 See: Dangerous People with Severe Personality Disorder, http://www.dspdprogramme.gov.uk/ Last accessed 21. 
January 2010 
286
 See Prisoners’ Advice Service - Information Sheet http://www.prisonersadvice.org.uk/documents/MicrosoftWord-
IPP2008.pdf Last accessed 20 August 2010. 
287
 Rose, N., Screen and Intervene, History of the Human Sciences 2010; 23; 79. p. 96. 
288
 Knoppers, B, M., Chadwick, R., Human Genetic Research: Emerging Trends in Ethics, Nature Reviews: Genetics 
January 2005; 6:75–79 
289
 Ibid. P. 75 
290
 Gottweis, H., Biobanks in action New strategies in the governance of life, in Gottweis, H., Petersen, A., (eds.) 
Biobanks: Governance in comparative perspective, 2008. Routledge, London 
 87 
simultaneously construct and dispel the idea of an autonomous individual.291 We are incited to act 
responsibly in the management of our vitality, yet, the principle guiding our own individual prudent 
action is increasingly the good of society. As Weiss concludes, self-governance and heteronomy are 
inseparably intertwined.292 Perhaps we are currently witnessing the reinvention of sociality in the 
form of ‘neosociality’.  
Neosocial society, in the words of Stephan Lessenich, ‘constitutes itself as a subject 
that demands active citizenship. Society is now prime reference of sociality and 
evaluates individual activities according to their degree of sociality’ […] This 
requires the individual’s capacity to monitor and control themselves – for the benefit 
of themselves and society. […] Being neosocial is thus tantamount to individuals that 
flexibly govern themselves and others by way of socially accepted means.293 
Hence we must raise the question whether intervening in biology – also for the sake of enhancement 
– does not harbour the risk of running exactly the opposite course as its supporters wish. Whether it 
could not be the case that the malleability of nature leads to an ever stronger re-inscription of social 
expectations? The next section looks at a scenario where risk thinking and the dissolution and 
dispersion of the body take on a rather radicalized and appalling form. 
 
From Freedom to Necessity 
 
As I have already briefly discussed Knoppers and Chadwick spoke of a communitarian turn in 
bioethics that mirrors actual developments in the biosciences. I would now like to introduce an 
example that takes the combination of risk-thinking and the communitarian turn to an extreme. I 
suggest that by using a somewhat exaggerated example I can capture some salient features of likely 
developments. My example comes from Julian Savulescu who heads the Uehiro Centre for Practical 
Ethics at Oxford University.  
Savulescu is one of the most outspoken proponents of enhancement technologies and 
because such thinkers are often accused of being harbingers of a new form of eugenics he made an 
effort to distinguish the project of enhancement from the dark past. In an attempt to justify the 
parental obligation to enhance Julian Savulescu wanted to separate the ‘old’ eugenics from current 
practices. He wrote 
What was objectionable about the eugenics movement, besides its shoddy scientific 
basis, was that it involved the imposition of a State vision for a healthy population 
and aimed to achieve this through coercion. The eugenics movement was not aimed 
at what was good for individuals, but rather what benefited society. Modern eugenics 
in the form of testing for disorders, such as Down syndrome, occurs very commonly 
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but is acceptable because it is voluntary, gives couples a choice over what kind of 
child to have, and enables them to have a child with the greatest opportunity for a 
good life.294 
In this section I want to first investigate just how free these choices actually are from a techno-
progessive position and argue that they are far less so than presumed by Savulescu.  
First, of all, in light of what has been said so far, it is obvious that the notion of “voluntary 
choice” is far from being self-evident or unproblematic. However, his argument is impossible to 
defend even on its own terms. Savulescu has expressed the opinion that parents not only have the 
option to enhance their children but that there is an obligation to do so. He claims that in a situation 
where biological enhancements were available we would actually wrong our children if we failed to 
provide everything scientifically possible in order to ensure their future success. 
Unless there is something special and optimal about our children’s physical, 
psychological, or cognitive abilities, or something different about other biological 
interventions, it would be wrong not to enhance them.295 
Of course, Savulescu argues that there is in fact no relevant difference between biological and other 
kinds of interventions. Problematic is that he does not explicate the meaning of the term “optimal” 
and given the notion’s versatility and slippery nature it actually seems that no child truly be 
considered optimal in all the relevant aspects. Thus his position seems to be at odds with the 
previous claim that individuals are free to decide on what kind of a child to have. It seems rather 
that they are obliged to have an “optimal” child otherwise they wrong the child. Failure to enhance 
certain traits – which Savulescu calls “all purpose means” – might very well be perceived as being 
equivalent to a form of child neglect or a serious omission on the side of the parent. Savulescu’s 
initially rather liberal sounding embracement of enhancement as an expansion of individual liberty 
turns out to be totally compatible with the imposition of socially ‘enforced’ or expected 
interventions as long as the enhancement in question had been deemed by some external standard to 
serve the best interests of the child.296 Savulescu might reply that we can draw a distinction between 
a moral obligation and a legal obligation. He might claim that it is morally wrong not to enhance, 
yet failure to do so does not lead to any legal penalties. Yet, if we consider that his argument is to  a 
certain extent predicated upon the complete abolishment of any difference between biological 
interventions and other forms of enhancement, such as education it becomes clear that failure of 
parents to enhance their child might incur legal penalties just as their failure to comply with 
mandatory education does.  
Now, as long as the biological interventions are aimed at such traits as intelligence we might 
be lenient and even grant that he has point. His argument gives reason to worry when he expands 
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the circle of attributes necessitating intervention to personality traits such as antisocial behaviour, 
which he considers to be a significant impediment to a “minimally decent life.” Thus, procreative 
liberty, which is a highly praised value and guiding principle for Savulescu might, in an extreme 
case, become subordinate to prescriptions or at least the actual set of social expectations concerning 
the desired biological make-up of people.  
This conclusion would in some sense align very well with the observation of Ruth Chadwick 
and Martha Knoppers that there is currently a shift towards communitarian principles in 
bioethics.297 Even though the authors seem to welcome this change I believe that the communitarian 
values on the rise at the moment are deeply troubling. What is troubling is the way the increased 
role of populations links up with thinking in terms of risks and prevention, which could make us 
loosen our commitment to liberal democracy far more than we would want to.  
On some occasions Savulescu has articulated the view that we may need biological 
adjustments because we are simply not fit to deal with the technological prowess we have come to 
possess. He believes that we will need to loosen our commitment to liberalism and the idea of 
democratic neutrality in order to face these challenges. In this model surveillance, being ‘at risk’ 
and the ‘screen and intervene’ regime described by Nikolas Rose gain a whole new meaning. 
Savulescu extends the idea of genetic risk to mean a potential threat to the human community 
broadly construed. Here is a clear expression of preference for communitarian principles. As an 
ardent supporter of enhancement technologies his views also faithfully depict the derogatory stance 
many have adopted of the nature of human existence which Savulescu interprets as an ultimately 
deficient form of life. In agreement with Hobbes Savulescu considers “the life of man, solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short”298, hence in dire need of technological improvement.  
Savulescu uses colourful and definitely pathetic language to illustrate our moral limitations 
and in effect raises the question how the radically deficient and limited human animal could be 
tamed with the help of biotechnologies.299 His question is ultimately the same as Sloterdijk’s from a 
decade ago, his answer is far less philosophically complicated. While he is motivated by the noble 
goal of ensuring human flourishing his conclusions make one more worried than relaxed. 
Technology is too powerful for our limited nature to control so we must make ourselves fit for the 
future. Thus, we confront another explication of the original cyborg idea. In this case, the 
“inhospitable” environment is provided by our own technologically permeated world that risks 
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driving us to extinction due to our own deficiencies.300 
On this account enhancement is no longer proposed as an option of individual choice, it is 
no longer an issue of morphological freedom, distributive justice, or a question of emancipating 
humanity from nature’s confines. It becomes a preventive measure.301 For Savulescu prevention is 
best achieved by monitoring the population very closely and by applying genetic selection in order 
to screen out those individuals who may pose a risk to society. Individuals are dangerous because 
our technological progress easily puts the potential of mass destruction at the fingertips of 
individuals over whom we have no control or oversight.302 
Thus for Savulescu it seems that in order to secure the safe and flourishing existence of 
mankind on its continued path of technological advancement we need to employ biological 
enhancements to become better than we are. It is no longer a question of will, desire or decision but 
one of necessity. Yet, at the point where enhancement is drawn into the realm of risk-thinking and 
prevention, and framed as an unavoidable “must” the ground becomes very shaky and we are drawn 
dangerously close to a system that considers population level interventions necessary in order to 
guarantee security. At this point his attempts to fundamentally separate the “old” eugenics from the 
“new” also collapses.  
All in all, it may turn out that human enhancement, which is usually couched in discussions 
on individual liberties and the fulfilment of human potentials in the end dissolves its very 
foundations and contributes to a far more, rather than a far less constrained, disciplined and 
normalized society. 
I certainly do not mean to say that Savulescu’s position represents a standard or even a 
mainstream in current debates. Rather, I want to suggest that his position, even though it may strike 
one as an absurd over exaggeration, it actually represents the logical conclusion and culmination of 
trends I have depicted. Namely, the trend of the shift towards communitarian principles, the 
dissolution of the body/individual and the heightened relevance of risks, surveillance and 
prevention.  
 Savulescu’s suggestion nicely illustrates a trend that has also been observed by legal 
scholars, namely that the overarching logic of prevention has become something of a catch-phrase 
in a public atmosphere crippled by a state of fear and insecurity. Preventive and pre-emptive 
measures are sought in the course of which “civil rights and procedural guarantees are given up.”303 
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 In the next section I want to bring one more brief example as to the consequences of the 
body dissolving in patterns of “objective” information. 
 
Putting the Data Together Again 
 
Even without any of the sophisticated technologies that may emerge in the future surveillance 
already reaches peak levels with attempts to achieve total information awareness304 of all suspicious 
activities and persons. Attempts at extending surveillance measures to human biology are also being 
tested. One such example is the MALINTENT system developed by the United States Department 
of Homeland Security, which is designed to scan biological traits such as blood pressure, heart rate, 
breath rate and non-verbal cues in order to identify harmful intentions.305(!) MALINTENT is 
planned to be employed at airports in order to screen out ‘harmful other’ but can easily be set up at 
any location and is ready to become operational in 2012. The analogy to an Orwellian thought-
police is almost just too obvious to mention. The great advantage of the system is that it works from 
afar without the scanned person necessarily being aware of the level of inspection she is undergoing 
at the moment. The goal is to identify biological markers that are unknown to the person bearing 
them but might reveal some concealed truth. There is increased interest in forms of “soft 
surveillance” that are non-intrusive and can remain ubiquitous.306 In this attempt we can truly 
witness how under the contemporary expansions of panopticism the autonomous, choosing self is 
dissolved in biological markers which are then reconstructed along the binary axis of 
“threatening/not-threatening” or some similar distinction which may reveal him as harbouring 
desires for destruction. The system is greatly reminiscent of the science fiction scenario in the 
movie Minority Report where a special operations agency cracked down on criminals before they 
had committed any crimes. MALINTENT offers a similar prospect moving the evidence for a 
crime-to-be-committed to the level of biological markers. 
Besides claims by eminent scholars questioning the scientific basis of such an application 
the American Civil Liberties Union has tried to argue that such biological information comprises 
sensible and personal data and thus cannot be extracted without consent.307 
Yet, in light of the previously described developments it seems sadly obvious that the 
however conceived interests of the community evidently trump the privacy rights of dissolved 
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individuals. Thus it is not so much the act of dissolution that matters but rather those rationalities 
and sites that have the power to rearrange, reconstruct and put the dispersed data together again. 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter I have briefly discussed Foucault’s notion of biopolitics and the field of inquiry that 
emerged from his concept of governing. This chapter has shifted the focus of attention from 
enhancement technologies in a strict sense and detailed some aspects of our current relation to 
technologies that can rightfully be considered precursors of possible enhancements. 
I have tried to show that our current biopolitical landscape is characterized simultaneously 
by the growing importance of selfhood and individual prudent decision-making in relation to our 
biological constitution that takes the form of a valuable and manageable asset, but also by 
tendencies that displace and dissolve the body. This dissolution is true both at the biological level 
where the body is dissolved in genetic susceptibilities, probabilities, genetic databases and various 
information patterns and also as an autonomous subject who may no longer occupy a central 
position in ethical deliberations. Also, I believe that the emphasis on self-monitoring and the 
constant pre-occupation with our vital status exacerbate the trend of normalizing the body. 
These tendencies are highly ambiguous and ambivalent bearing liberatory potential in the 
form of challenging time-worn dichotomies as individuals recognize their growing embeddedness 
in social and technological relations of increasing complexity. Yet, I believe my examples also 
highlight a problematic tendency that is implicated by our increasingly cyborgian nature. As the 
body becomes more porous, dislocated and integrated in technological systems the potentially 
liberatory effects are captured and subsumed under regimes of performance-enhancement, 
surveillance, screening and prevention. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has dealt with the question of humanity’s ever increasing merger with technology. It has 
started with a historical overview of the idea that humans can employ reason, science and 
technology in order to make themselves better than they are. As I have tried to show this idea has a 
fairly long and colourful history in the West that is often marked by the most gruesome acts of 
cruelty imaginable. Judging by this one fact human nature certainly leaves a lot to wish for. This 
brief historical reconstruction has led me to a discussion of current philosophical positions that are 
either staunchly opposed or joyously expectant of new technologies that promise even more 
possibilities of intervention. I have done my best to argue that both of these camps are captivated by 
a view of technology that is untenable. Some, who identify themselves as humanists fear that 
technology will dehumanize us and rob us of our essence. Others who – ironically – also call 
themselves humanists, nevertheless of a trans-, or post- type believe that we will ultimately achieve 
and realize a centuries old promise, namely the promise of liberation and emancipation. Both of 
them seem wrong in measuring the extent to which technology has already shaped that what we are 
and how it is intertwined with whatever we are to become.  
Taking this understanding as my starting point I have in the end tried to write about the 
context, our context within which we are joined with emerging biotechnologies. Admittedly I have 
laid significantly more emphasis on drawing out the contours of some of the problems and troubling 
aspects I see. My excuse is that I have constantly found myself in vain of trying to identify 
sufficient reason for celebration.  
Now that I have come to the end I want to raise the question that had been my motivation for 
writing all along. The short version of the question is: What is to be done?308 The longer version 
comes from Foucault: “What is at stake, then, is this: How can the growth of capabilities be 
disconnected from the intensification of power relations?”309 
How can emerging technologies be employed in a way that is furthering of human potentials 
while avoiding most of the dangers I have sketched? And I have only sketched a few. Or rather, how 
can we aim for a world where the questions of emerging and enhancement technologies are not 
framed by risk, surveillance and prevention? It is in essence a search for effective forms of 
resistance. Simply “not going along” does not seem to be an option, but I must admit to having 
found no elaborate and sophisticated answer. Hence I must conclude with expressing my 
commitment to keep on thinking. Borrowing from second-rate science fiction series:  
…to be continued 
                                                 
308
 Gane, N., When We Have Never Been Human, What Is to Be Done?: Interview with Donna Haraway, Theory 
Culture Society 2006; 23; 135, pp. 135-158 
309
 Foucault, M., What is Enlightenment? In Rabinow, P., (ed.) The Foucault Reader, New York, Pantheon Books, 1984. 
p. 48. 
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Deutsche Kurzfassung 
 
Fortschritte im Bereich der Medizin und der Biotechnologie haben vorher als fundamental und 
solide geltenden Grenzziehungen, wie jene zwischen natürlich-künstlich oder lebendig-tot disloziert 
und verunsichert. Mit dem Verschwimmen der scharfen Trennung zwischen heilenden, restitutiven 
Eingriffen und verbessernden, optimierenden Maßnahmen wird es allmählich möglich werden 
explizit in die „menschliche Natur“ einzugreifen um erwünschte Modifikationen zu unternehmen. 
 Die Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit dem Fragenkomplex der verbessernden Technologien 
und besteht aus drei Teilen. Zuerst soll eine historische Rekonstruktion der Idee der technologischen 
Verbesserung des Menschen gegeben werden. Es handelt sich um eine ideengeschichtliche 
Skizzierung die vor Augen führen wird, wie umfangreich die Geschichte dieser Idee ist und welche 
philosophische Strömungen auf gegenwärtige Positionen Einfluss ausgeübt haben. Diese 
geschichtliche Einführung führt zu den gegenwärtigen Debatten um die Normativität der 
menschlichen Natur, bzw. der Frage in welchem Verhältnis technologische Manipulationen zum 
Menschen stehen.  
Im zweiten Teil sollen also wichtige Autoren der aktuellen Debatte diskutiert werden, wie 
Jürgen Habermas und Francis Fukuyama, die von einer starken Normativität der menschlichen 
Natur ausgehen und meinen, dass die Grenzen der technologischen Verfügbarmachung in der 
menschlichen Natur liegen. Andererseits kommen auch solche Autoren zum Wort die in neuen 
technologischen Möglichkeiten eine Chance sehen die Schränke des Menschseins zu durchbrechen 
und eine helle „posthumane“ Zukunft einzuleiten.  
Auf der Grundlage von technikphilosophischen Argumenten wie jene von Donna Haraway und 
Katherine Hayles versucht die Arbeit die These stark zu machen, dass beide Positionen in der 
Debatte das ko-konstitutive Verhältnis zwischen Mensch und Technik viel zu wenig beachten. Beide 
Gruppen fassen Technik im Sinne eines Instruments auf mithilfe dessen die menschliche Natur 
entweder beschmutzt oder befreit werden kann. Im Gegensatz, scheinen Verbesserungs-, und 
konvergierenden Technologien andere Fragen aufzuwerfen, wenn wir das Verhältnis komplexer 
denken.  
Im dritten Teil wird Technik weder als Mittel zur Befreiung, noch als eine drohende Form 
der Instrumentalisierung und Entmenschlichung aufgefasst sondern etwas viel ambivalenteres das 
sowohl befreiende als auch potentiell unterdrückende Potentiale birgt. Rückgreifend auf Foucault´s 
Konzept der Biopolitik und der Governmentality Studies werden einige wichtige Züge der 
gegenwärtigen biopolitischen Landschaft diskutiert. Im Vordergrund stehen die Verallgemeinerung 
eines Risikodenkens und die wachsende Rolle vor preventiven Maßnahnamen und Screening-
Verfahren. 
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